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 This is dedicated to all those whose worries rob them of peace. It is my hope that this 
work might help someone to live life more fully and freely. Having it complete will 
certainly help me to do so.
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Abstract 
 
Pathological worry is a primary component of Generalized Anxiety Disorder and a 
routine concern treated in most modern-day counseling offices and clinics. The intended 
purpose of the current study was to seek out evidence of possible antidotes or protective 
factors to pathological worry. The primary focus began with the concept of faith as a 
correlate to meaning in life, meaning being understood as the antithesis of despair 
(despairing being synonymous with worrying at pathological levels). As an attempt at 
providing an explanation for what comprises the differing levels of faith development, 
the constructs of basic psychological needs (autonomy, competence, and relatedness) 
and spiritual transcendence were included in the study.   
It was hypothesized that basic psychological needs would vary according to faith 
stage and that these differing combinations of need satisfaction would predict the 
content and quantity of one’s worries.  It was also hypothesized that meaning in life and 
spiritual transcendence would be uniquely represented by faith development stage and 
that these constructs would also contribute to the quantity and content of one’s worry.  
It was found that some, but not all, psychological needs significantly predicted worry. 
Surprisingly, faith development, according to scores on the current scale used, 
negatively correlated to worry, such that higher levels of worry were found at lower 
levels of faith development. Presence of meaning in life was also found to negatively 
correlate with worry.
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Chapter 1: Problem Statement 
 
 This study is seeking to explore the possible relationship between two constructs 
that have pervaded the course of human history, worry and faith.  While religiosity is a 
construct that has been operationalized and explored, though it would seem in 
somewhat superficial ways (attendance, religious affiliation, etc.), the concept of faith 
explored here should not be confused with this notion of religiosity.  Faith, understood 
for the context of this study is an active, dynamic construct centering on transcendence 
of the self and search for meaning (Fowler, 1981; 1986).  Worry is identified as existing 
in both normal and pathological states and concerning a number of differing domains 
(Holaway, Rodebaugh, & Heimberg, 2006).  Following the theory proposed by 
Boehnke, Schwartz, Stromberg, and Sagiv (1998), the construct of worry is considered 
not only in the broad sense that it is the fearful anticipation of a possible future event, 
but also that it is specifically the notion of micro (self-focused) worry that results in the 
manifestation of pathology and degradation of overall well-being.  This study seeks to 
further the field’s knowledge of what can serve as protective factors against 
pathological worry [the predominant feature of Generalized Anxiety Disorder, as 
defined in the DSM-V (American Psychiatric Association, 2013)] (Campbell-Sills & 
Brown, 2010). 
If pathological worry is ultimately a state of despair regarding one’s perceived 
inability to overcome a threat to the self, a proposed antidote is the personal 
engagement of meaning.  If one believes an experience and/or life to be ripe for the 
creation of meaning then the potential exists to move from helpless, worried victim to 
empowered participant (whether or not the feared threat can be avoided).  In order to 
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engage this opportunity for meaning, it would seem that the basic psychological needs 
of autonomy, competence, and relatedness would need to be sufficiently satisfied, so as 
to leave the individual believing in his or her ability to self-determine (Ryan & Deci, 
2000).  Religion and faith as meaning have spanned time, geography, and humankind.  
The questions of how they impact humanity, for better or worse, are important ones, 
and this study hopes to enter into this dialogue.  Too often it seems these constructs are 
discussed as if they are all-inclusive (yet exclusive) magic pills, the swallowing of 
which will cure all ills.  The perspective of the study is not tailored to a particular 
religious affiliation, but rather, explores faith as an ecumenical and universal human 
experience.  It seeks to acknowledge the complex nature and impact of the construct by 
exploring not only its makeup (meaning and self-determination), but also its potential 
impact or interplay with one of the most debilitating aspects of psychological 
life…pathological worry.  
It is hypothesized here that worry content and quantity will be predicted by and 
related to one’s faith stage, faith stage being understood in Fowler’s (1981) terms, as 
well as by how that faith stage stance is distinctly represented by satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction of basic psychological needs and meaning in life. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
The Construct of Worry 
 Worry is a construct that studies have shown is distinct from other similar 
constructs and significantly related to poor mental health outcomes (McLaughlin, 
Borkovec, & Sibrava, 2007).  McLaughlin et al. constructed two studies comparing 
undergraduate student participants on effects of worry and rumination.  In both studies, 
students were instructed to induce a state episode of worry or rumination.  In the second 
study, students were selected based on having endorsed trait worry and rumination or 
high rumination only (“high worry only” existed in only two participants of over 1,500 
surveyed).  The participants in the first study were a convenience sample of students not 
tested for trait versus state worry/rumination.  Worry is similar to “rumination” and 
attempts have been made to combine the two terms into one construct focused around 
the idea of repetitive thought (McEvoy, Mahoney, & Moulds, 2010).  The difference 
between the two, however, is their temporal nature. Rumination is focused on past or 
current failures and repeatedly rehearsing them, whereas worry is focused on the future.   
The McLaughlin et al. (2007) studies also looked at type of cognitive process 
engaged (thought versus cognition in the form of imagery), and supported the concept 
that worry is a thought-based, verbal cognitive activity.  In both studies, after worry 
induction, rate of thought significantly increased from baseline, whereas imagery 
significantly decreased (rumination mostly followed the same pattern, but deviations 
from baseline were much smaller).  It was found that rumination was more highly 
correlated to depression and worry was more correlated to anxiety.  In the case of 
rumination, the event is past and to continue to dwell builds a sense of hopelessness and 
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subsequent depression.  In the case of worry, the event has yet to happen, and if it is 
perceived that the worrier has (or should have) some control over the occurrence of the 
event, then the response is anxiety.  Both worry and rumination resulted in generating 
increased negative affect and decreased positive affect. 
Esters, Tracey, and Millar (2007) developed the Things I Worry About Scale, 
and the highest endorsed theme in their sample was “future failure and loss.”  
Rumination and worry have similar consequences and both correlate to depression and 
anxiety.  Self-focused attention and rumination have been linked to pessimistic outlook 
and poor problem-solving strategies (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; 
Lyubomirsky, Boehm, Kasri, & Zehm, 2011). 
Worry has also been found to be distinct from the construct of neuroticism, and 
it has been suggested it should be identified as more of a trait than state construct (Hale, 
Klimstra, & Meeus, 2010).  Especially interesting regarding this study by Hale and 
colleagues, is the contribution it makes towards this discussion of worry as a trait.  
While worry is a cognitive, thought-based exercise, this study lends confirmatory 
evidence to what anyone who has worried knows, that worry manifests itself in 
emotional, and subsequently physical ways.  An important question is whether the 
presence of this negative affect prompts the worry or whether the cognitive practice of 
worry results in diagnosable mood disorders and other negative affect, which would 
attest to worry’s trait qualities.  Whether or not trait worry was present, in the same 
previously mentioned study by McLaughlin et al. (2007), induced worry (state) 
generated increases in negative and decreases in positive affect.  Trait worry 
participants had baselines differing from non-trait worry participants, but the effect was 
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the same for both groups.  Even when worry is a tendency (trait), the participant is still 
vulnerable to episodes of state worry and its effects.  Due to the cognitive nature of 
worry and its demonstrated effect on affect when induced, it is logical to assume that 
the practice of worry has a greater generative impact on affect than the reverse (though 
once begun, the relational cycle is most likely somewhat reciprocal). 
 “Excessive, difficult to control” worry is the predominant feature of the DSM-V 
diagnosis of Generalized Anxiety Disorder (APA, 2013).  As a disorder, GAD is 
experienced in approximately 2-5% of the population and 55-60% of those presenting 
with GAD are female. A definition of worry well-represented in the literature is that of 
Borkovec (1994) in which worry is defined as a “verbal stream of uncontrollable, 
negative thoughts directed toward a future threat.”  This definition is consistent with 
another offered by Boehnke et al. (1998) that defines worry as an emotionally disruptive 
thought that a state of life will become, remain, or become more discrepant with its 
desired state.  As previously mentioned, it follows from this definition that worry is 
more or less a cognitive activity.  Theories of worry have, for the most part, followed 
suit.  
One theory of worry posits that worriers utilize their worry as a means for 
helping them find ways of avoiding negative future events or to prepare for a future 
worst-case scenario. In a study by Borkovec and Roemer (1995) it was found that the 
two reasons just mentioned are the highest-rated reasons given by individuals diagnosed 
with GAD for why they worry.  In their two studies, they surveyed undergraduates to 
determine the presence of GAD and then compared “anxious,” “nonanxious,” and 
“partially anxious” samples.  It was found that worriers in general thought they used 
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worry in seemingly constructive ways including preparation, increasing motivation, and 
prevention.  GAD participants differed from nonanxious as well as nonworried anxious 
participants in their belief that worry made the feared event less likely, helped in 
problem solving situations, and that it served as a distraction from “even more 
emotional things.”  This finding is significant in that it offers an explanation for the 
“uncontrollable” nature that worry takes on in people with GAD.  When emotional 
content is aversive and the person is unable to control it, worry may be employed as a 
way to escape, but then becomes uncontrollable as well.  This study, testimonies from 
patients with GAD, and anecdotal evidence support the notion that worry does at times 
serve as an avoidance tactic (Kertz & Woodruff-Borden, 2011). 
Borkovec (2002) authored a commentary whose title highlights this aspect of 
avoidance: “life in the future vs. life in the present.”  Worry serves as an avoidant tactic 
by sounding the alarm of a potential threat.  This alarm hypothetically prompts action, 
but since worry is concerned with future events that have not yet, and may never, occur, 
often the only action that can conceivable occur is to continue to prepare in one’s mind 
(worry).  Because of the high probability of most worries not coming to fruition, a 
superstition reinforcement loop could also be at play supporting the avoidant nature of 
worry.  Due to an event about which an individual spent time worrying not occurring, 
the individual may well make the connection that the worry actually decreased the 
likelihood of the worrisome event (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995).  The cognitive nature 
of worry also supports the notion that worry could be a means of avoiding other fears 
that may have more emotional clout (i.e., worrying about surface issues to avoid facing 
the real crises at hand) (Borkovec, Ray, & Stober, 1998). 
7 
Some connections to faith could also be hypothesized here, in that the 
uncontrollable emotional content driving the worry aspect of GAD could be addressed 
in some instances through certain aspects of faith. These could include connection and 
reliance on others in times of need, a resistance to becoming individually overwhelmed 
by personal problems by ascribing meaning or putting them in a more universal context, 
connection to a transcendent being(s), etc. 
A second theory of worry is a meta-cognitive model posited by Wells (2006), 
which focuses on positive/negative beliefs about worry.  In this model a negative event 
triggers troublesome, intrusive thoughts in an individual.  This individual is then 
prompted by these negative thoughts to react by utilizing worry as a coping strategy.  
The decision is made based on positive beliefs about worry as a good means of coping 
(i.e., worry helps get things done, helps solve problems, etc.).  However, as worry leads 
to the processing of all the negative possibilities concerning the focus of the worry, the 
individual experiences anxiety, which prompts negative beliefs about worry (i.e., worry 
is uncontrollable or dangerous).  The person then begins worrying about worrying 
(“Type-2 worry”) which is a difficult spiral to escape. Jansson and Linton (2006) in 
studies on worry’s contributions to insomnia identified that worry tends to compound 
over time, building on itself.  Studies have shown that individuals diagnosed with GAD 
endorse a higher number of positive and negative beliefs about worry than others, and 
that those endorsements come with a greater intensity (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995).  
Studies have also shown that these positive and negative beliefs are correlated to the 
presence of pathological worry in an individual but that the presence of negative beliefs 
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about worry tends to serve as the strongest indicator (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; 
Wells, 2006).  
A third approach is focused on worry as a component of problem-solving 
strategies (Davey, 1994b).  Davey found that children who generated a greater number 
of avoidant problem-solving solutions yet had a low level of problem solving 
confidence tended to have increased worry.  As problem-solving strategies are thwarted 
(or unable to be realized due to the avoidant, future-focused nature of worry) it would 
be a logical conclusion that confidence would be affected and worry would potentially 
ensue.  However, another review by Davey (1994a) found that worrying was related to 
only problem-solving confidence and perceived control rather than problem-solving 
ability.  The study suggested that worriers (both low and high, trait and non-trait) tended 
to have problems in acting on solution possibilities as opposed to coming up with 
possibilities for action.  This approach flows directly into the previously discussed 
meta-cognitive theory of worry. 
Davey, Tallis, and Capuzzo (1996) explored beliefs about the consequences of 
worry and found that individuals strongly endorsing either positive (i.e., worry helps 
motivate and prompts analytical thinking) or negative beliefs (or both) about worry’s 
consequences resulted in positive correlations to poor psychological outcomes.  In their 
study, they first used a participant pool of 128 undergraduate students aged 18-59.  The 
participants were asked to indicate in what ways worrying made things better or worse.  
Based on the items parsed out from the initial data gathering, two factor analyses were 
carried out with new participant pools to confirm the presence of five factors 
concerning typically expected consequences of worrying.  Negative consequences were 
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represented by the following factors: 1) worrying disrupts effective performance, 2) 
worrying exaggerates the problem, and 3) worrying causes emotional discomfort.  The 
two positive consequence factors were: 1) worry motivates and 2) worry helps 
analytical thinking.  The presence of these perceived positive consequences are 
consistent with conceptualizing worry as a problem solving issue, as both are needed 
components of coping with problems (in particular the analytical thinking component).  
The scale developed concerning the consequences of worry was then re-administered to 
a new sample and the relationship between worry perception and mental health was 
explored.  It was in this experiment of the study that it was found that people holding 
high positive or negative (or both) beliefs about worry were more likely to demonstrate 
poor psychological profiles when looking at a number of questionnaires than those 
endorsing lower score beliefs. 
The concepts of worry listed above tend to deal more with the question of “why” 
as opposed to “what.”  Schwartz, Sagiv, and Boehnke (2000) began to explore this 
notion of the actual composition of worries.  They propose that worries are based on an 
individual’s values (i.e., that one will worry more about what they value most).  This 
theory is not incompatible with those previously discussed, but begins to move into a 
deeper examination of the construct.  These authors define values as “a core component 
of one’s identity that serve as guiding principles in selecting, interpreting, evaluating, 
and justifying one’s own behavior and that of others.”  They go on to identify ten value 
types (power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, 
benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security) situated on two dimensions.  The two 
dimensions representing the contrast and complement between types are: self-
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enhancement versus self-transcendence and openness to change versus conservatism.  
On the self-enhancement versus self-transcendence, dimension the power and 
achievement value types (pursuit of self-interests) contrast the universalism and 
benevolence types (concern for others).  On the openness to change versus 
conservatism dimension, the self-direction and stimulation value types (independence 
and readiness for newness) contrast the security, conformity, and tradition value types 
(restricted and resistant to change). 
Schwartz et al. suggest that values are desired goals whereas worries are 
contextualized thoughts about actions or events seen to be in contrast to value-driven 
goals.  They go on to hypothesize about which values will correlate to two specifically 
defined types of worry.  SDT (Deci & Ryan, 2000) is referenced as a potential 
explanation for why emphasis on the power value type (extrinsic goal motivation) 
would tend to result in increased self-focused (micro) worry; whereas, the value types 
of universalism, self-direction, and benevolence (intrinsic goal motivation) would tend 
to result in lower levels of self-focused worry.   
Boehnke, et al. (1998) posited a theory of micro versus macro worries.  They 
build on a theory of worry by Levy and Guttman (1975) that suggests worry is 
comprised of five differing facets.  Emphasis for the purposes of this review is placed 
on the first three: self versus others, life domains (e.g., health, finances, security, etc.), 
and time (i.e., past, present, future).  They propose worries can be categorized and 
subsequently measured according to these facets.  Boehnke, et al. (1998) proposed two 
primary facets of worry: 1) the object whose welfare is threatened, and 2) the domain of 
life to which a worry refers.   
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The first facet distinguishes between micro and macro worry.  Micro worry is 
worry focused on the self and/or what one considers his or her in-group (i.e., family, 
friends).  Macro worry is focused on the broader, external representations of society and 
the world.  While somewhat interrelated, their study demonstrated the two distinct 
constructs of micro and macro worry.  The domains (2nd facet) identified by the study 
and confirmed through factor analysis were: safety and health, social relations, 
environment, economics, achievement, and meaning.  Each domain (an exception was 
the environment domain which only loaded as a macro worry) has a micro and macro 
worry possibility.  For example, within the achievement domain, one could worry about 
self and/or partner’s vocational success (micro) or worry about his or her nation’s 
unbalanced budget and declining GDP (macro).  Within the social relations domain, one 
could worry about their likeability or attractiveness (micro) or hostilities between 
nations (macro).  What the study found when comparing micro versus macro worries to 
measures of mental health (satisfaction with life, Trier Mental Health Scale, positive 
affect, trait anxiety and negative affect), was that increases in micro worries correlated 
with increases in anxiety and depression and tended to suggest poor mental health.  
Increased macro worrying tended to have no effect or a marginally positive effect on 
mental health.   
Micro worriers by definition have difficulty with self-preoccupation.  
Lyubomirsky, et al. (2011) found that too much self-reflection and dwelling on 
problems or circumstances tended to lead to unhappiness and impaired mental health.  
Though a causal link cannot be made in terms of micro worry and poor mental health, 
both would seem to prohibit or prevent one’s ability to worry on a macro level.  The one 
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exception to this rule seems to be micro worries within the domain of safety and health, 
which evidenced no positive correlations to poorer mental health.  One explanation for 
this finding may be found in a study by Schmiege, Bryan, and Klein (2009).  Their 
study, based on a health psychology perspective, suggested that the presence of health-
related worry indicated a greater likelihood to engage in preventative behaviors, which 
potentially resulted in accomplishment of health-related goals.   
One logical conclusion when considering the health and safety exceptions of 
micro worry can be found with Maslow’s (1943) theory of human motivation, which 
later came to be most well known as his hierarchy of needs.  Fulfillment of 
physiological, followed by safety, needs is necessary for the very survival of the 
individual.  They come first, at the bottom of the hierarchy, before more 
complex/cerebral aspects of need (i.e., love, self-esteem, and ultimately self-
actualization).  This fact serves to provide some rationale as to why worry in these areas 
would not necessarily be harmful to the individual as it potentially helps them survive.   
Worry and its Role in Development 
 The general concept of worry can be summarized as anticipation or expectation 
of an impending threat. It is when worry becomes a chronic sense of anticipation and 
readiness that it becomes pathological stress, and the relationship between stress and 
development has been well established (Juster et al., 2011).   
Lovallo’s (2005) landmark work on stress highlights that stress is a state of 
tension and that chronic stress results in what is known as allostatic load.  Allostatic 
load has been found to have an effect on poor physical and subsequently cognitive 
development. Sterling and Eyer (1988) coined the term allostasis to represent the idea 
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that when an organism reacts to a stressor and alters its behavior to restore homeostasis 
in one area of functioning, the area where the change occurred may serve to affect the 
system in a deleterious way over time.  The cumulative effect of this hardship is 
summed up in the term allostatic load, which was a concept presented by McEwen and 
Stellar (1993).  These concepts are important when considering the effects of stress in 
development, in that, even when stressful events are seemingly navigated and 
“handled,” when the stressor is chronic (i.e. worry), though homeostasis appears to be 
maintained (i.e. worry is normal), the allostatic load has a cost to the individual’s ability 
to develop and maintain functioning in “normal” healthy ways.  This chronicity 
logically connects to Wells’ (2006) notion of “type 2 worry” (worry about worrying), 
and the concept of allostatic load certainly attests to the stress that would be created by 
the circular, self-perpetuating nature of type 2 worry. 
 As worry is a cognitive event, the effect of cognitive development on worry is 
an important issue to address.  Muris et al. (2002) examined cognitive development and 
worry in a sample of children aged 6-13.  They found that cognitive development was 
significantly correlated to the development of personal worry, whereas the presence of 
fearfulness seemed to decrease with cognitive development.  An additional study by 
Grist and Field (2012) supports the findings of Muris et al.  They suggested that ability 
to worry is associated with increased verbal and abstraction abilities (a movement to 
concrete and the formal-operational stages of cognition and perception).  This would 
also coincide with the ability to have positive and negative beliefs about worrying as 
well as the ability to verbalize them.  Both of these abilities have been theorized as 
components of worry (Wells, 2006; Borkovec, 1997).  Laing et al. (2009) noted that 
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worry in young children was correlated to the presence of ritual and that, as children 
developed, the presence of these factors would decrease but would then re-emerge at 
other developmental milestones (e.g., increases in social anxiety noted in adolescence).  
Chorpita et al. (1997) also found that older children tended to score higher than younger 
children on the Penn State Worry Questionnaire version for children (PSWQ-C).  The 
researchers also found that females tend to endorse higher levels of worry than males.   
Kertz and Woodruff-Borden (2011) propose a developmental psychopathology 
model of worry that incorporates multi-level development (cognitive, emotional, 
parental factors) and also suggests worry is best understood blending multiple models of 
worry theory (positive and negative beliefs about worry, problem orientation, 
intolerance of uncertainty and information processing ability).  Their model allowed for 
worry at a young age but was consistent with the literature concerning increased ability 
to worry as one develops. 
 With literature suggesting that worry increases as one develops, the question of 
when or if these increases stop must be asked.  Szabo (2009) studied the worry content 
of children and young adults with a sample of 42 undergraduate students and two 
samples of public school children with a mean reported age of 19 for the adult sample 
and mean ages of 8.7 and 11 for the child sample.  The researcher found that adults and 
children differed in the content of their worry, with adults worrying more about social 
outcomes (which was identified by the researchers and participants as less “bad” or 
threatening) and children worrying more about physical threats.  It was found that adults 
worry at increased levels compared to children about things both groups acknowledged 
as more trivial in terms of perceived threat.  In a study comparing elderly and young 
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adult samples, it was found that overall the elderly sample worried less (Basevitz et al., 
2008).  It has also been noted that the elderly worry more about physical threat, which 
would suggest a curvilinear relationship regarding worry content when compared to the 
findings of Szabo (2009) (Wetherell, 2006).  This relationship may be in part explained 
based on the reality that the likelihood and gravity of threats to elderly and young are 
elevated.  What is noteworthy is that middle adults simply transitioned their worry to 
different aspects of life that seemingly had less to do with actual survival of the physical 
self. 
The Measurement of Worry  
The presence of pathological worry has been correlated to anxiety but remains a 
distinct construct (Rijsoort, Emmelkamp, & Vervaeke, 1999).  As a construct it has 
been isolated and successfully measured with primarily two main assessments, the Penn 
State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990) and the Worry Domains 
Questionnaire (WDQ; Tallis et al., 1992) (Stober, 1998).  The PSWQ is primarily a 
measure of the presence of clinically significant pathological worry and lists 16 
dysfunctional characteristics of worry (e.g. “I worry all the time”, “My worries 
overwhelm me”), whereas the WDQ measures non-pathological (normal/non-trait) 
worry.  The WDQ has respondents rate how much they worry on 25 different items 
across five domains: (D1) Relationships, (D2) Lack of confidence, (D3) Aimless 
Future, (D4) Work, and (D5) Financial. 
The measures both represent distinctly different foci pertaining to the construct 
of worry.  The PSWQ indicates the severity of the person’s tendency to worry, whereas 
the WDQ indicates the primary objects of their worry.  Both measures share similarly 
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high internal consistencies and demonstrate good convergent validity.  Studies 
examining problem solving as a root cause for worry have also used these measures and 
then correlated the results with separate problem-solving measures (Davey, 1994a). 
As previously mentioned, Boehnke et al. (1998) developed a measure to assess 
the presence of micro- and macro-worry in individuals.  To develop the measure they 
build upon a 20-item measure of existential worries developed by Goldenring and 
Doctor (1986).  Thirteen additional worry items were developed and identified through 
confirmatory factor analysis as either micro or macro worries.  Similarity structure 
analysis was also used to identify seven worry domains across which these thirty-three 
items were spread.  The seven domains identified were health, environment, social 
relations, meaning, achievement (work), economics, and safety.  The measure was 
developed using samples of Israelis and Germans.  With each item, respondents were 
asked to consider: “How worried, if at all, am I about it?”  Respondents then indicated 
their response using a 0 to 4 Likert-type scale labeled: “0” –not at all worried, “2” –
somewhat worried, “4” –extremely worried.  Examples of micro items would be “my 
getting cancer” (health domain), “my not having any close friends” (social relations 
domain), or “someone in my family not having enough money” (economic domain).  
Examples of macro items would be “people in the world dying of hunger” (health 
domain), “conflict among groups in our society” (social relations), “many people in my 
country living in poverty” (economic domain).  The measure has demonstrated adequate 
validity as well as cross-cultural reliability on diverse international samples (Schwartz 
et al., 2000; Boehnke & Wong, 2011). 
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Faith and Worry 
 Though the stage theory being utilized for this study de-emphasizes the primacy 
of institutionalized religion, it is important to point out the link between religion-based 
faith and worry.  The following quotes contain excerpts from some of the world’s major 
religions regarding their stance on worry.  The quotes either come from religious holy 
texts (i.e. Bible, Quran), or are attributed to people who would be representative of 
Fowler’s more developed faith stages:   
“There is nothing that wastes the body like worry, and one who has any faith in 
God should be ashamed to worry about anything whatsoever” (Mahatma Ghandi) 
  "And He provides for him from (sources) he never could imagine. And if anyone 
puts his trust in Allah, sufficient is (Allah) for him. For Allah will surely accomplish 
His purpose. Verily, for all things has Allah appointed a due proportion.” (Quran 65:3) 
"How many are the creatures that carry not their own sustenance? It is Allah 
Who feeds them and you, for He hears and knows all things.” (Quran 29:60) 
“And then I got to Memphis. And some began to say the threats, or talk about 
the threats that were out. What would happen to me from some of our sick white 
brothers? Well, I don't know what will happen now. We've got some difficult days 
ahead. But it doesn't really matter with me now because I've been to the mountaintop. I 
don't mind. Like anybody, I would like to live - a long life; longevity has its place. But 
I'm not concerned about that now. I just want to do God's will. And He's allowed me to 
go up to the mountain. And I've looked over. And I've seen the Promised Land. I may 
not get there with you. But I want you to know tonight, that we, as a people, will get to 
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the Promised Land. So I'm happy, tonight. I'm not worried about anything. I'm not 
fearing any man. Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord.” 
(Martin Luther King, Jr.) 
“The secret of health for both mind and body is not to mourn for the past, worry 
about the future, or anticipate troubles, but to live in the present moment wisely and 
earnestly.” (The Buddha) 
“If you have fear of some pain or suffering, you should examine whether there is 
anything you can do about it. If you can, there is no need to worry about it; if you 
cannot do anything, then there is also no need to worry.”  (Dalai Lama) 
"Fret not yourself...trust in the Lord...trust in Him.” (Psalms 37:1-7) 
“So don’t worry about tomorrow, for tomorrow will bring its own worries.  
Today’s trouble is enough for today.” (Matthew 6:34) 
"Don’t worry about anything, instead pray about everything…"  (Philippians 
4:8) 
“There is only one way to happiness and that is to cease worrying about things 
which are beyond the power of our will.”  (Epictetus) 
“Be careful what you water your dreams with. Water them with worry and fear 
and you will produce weeds that choke the life from your dream. Water them with 
optimism and solutions and you will cultivate success. Always be on the lookout for 
ways to turn a problem into an opportunity for success.”  (Lao Tzu) 
As these various quotes and sayings indicate, Hinduism, Judaism, Ancient 
Stoicism, Taoism, Islam, Buddhism, and Christianity all have indications that it is best 
if their adherents avoid worry.  Even a review of Sartre reveals a charge to not be 
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paralyzed by anxiety, but to transcend, through freedom and choice, to become that 
which one might (Pearce, 2011).  Much of the literature focuses on religion’s 
relationship to anxiety, as opposed to faith or spirituality (Shreve-Neiger & Edelstein, 
2004).  However, the findings from studies are varied, with some showing increases and 
others decreases in different forms of anxiety considering differing levels of religiosity 
(which is not to be confused with faith, but is a potentially related construct).  Using the 
faith development scale (Leak, 1999) with an attachment inventory, Hart, Limke, and 
Budd (2010) found that anxious attachment style was correlated to faith development 
such that increased anxious attachment resulted in lower developmental faith stage.  
The instrument used to measure faith development correlated directly to Fowler’s 
stages.  A sample of undergraduate students from a small Christian liberal arts 
university was used for the study.  The finding was confirmatory regarding hypotheses 
made and suggested that attachment styles formed with primary caregivers and then 
perpetuated in later romantic relationships correlated with one’s faith development.  The 
perspective is a valuable one as inhibitors to faith development are considered.  Also, 
the logical relationship between anxious attachment and worry is noteworthy, in that it 
indicated a potential link upon which the current study will hopefully build. 
While the literature is sparse regarding the relationship between spirituality or 
faith (as the current study has operationalized the construct) and anxiety, much has been 
published concerning religion as a correlate.  It (religious faith/religiosity) has been 
found to have a positive effect on overall psychological well-being, coping and 
functioning, and decreased psychological distress (Laurencelle, Abell, & Schwartz, 
2002; Plante, Yancey, Sherman, & Guertin, 2000; Pfeifer & Waelty, 1999; Rasic et al., 
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2011; Rosmarin, Krumrei, & Andersson, 2009).  St. Clair (2005) discusses his use of 
Native spirituality in treatment of cancer and the bringing about of harmony (implies 
absence of pathological worry).  Whereas worry is the expectation of bad things, hope is 
the expectancy of good.  Studies have shown hope to be a powerful calming agent in 
stressful situations (Ai, Pargament, Appel, & Kronfol, 2010; Rutjens, van der Plight, & 
van Harreveld, 2009).  Consistent with the focus of this study, Delgado et al. (2010) 
outline the positive effects of mindfulness (associated with transcendence) on chronic 
worry.   
Religion has historically been a manifestation of faith and as a construct it seems 
to have had mixed results serving as a buffer to worry.  While the research demonstrates 
some positive effects of religion, the author is suggesting that faith is a separate, more 
personal, and a far more active ingredient than the broader idea of religion.  Previously 
mentioned faith/spirituality is being defined in part as a transcendental search for 
meaning.  If worry represents self-centered despair (be it existential despair or more 
immediate specific circumstantial despair) then it stands to reason that others-focused 
meaning would serve as an opposing force for good (Erikson, 1950).  A study by James 
and Samuels (1999) finds a correlation between having experienced high stress life 
events and subsequently reporting a more mature (others-encompassing/accepting) 
spiritual stance.  These findings would support a query into the impact of a self-
transcendent spirituality on worry, a source of much stress.  More specifically, one area 
the current proposal seeks to explore is the relationship between potential protective 
factors of faith development (a movement towards increasing levels of self-
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transcendence) and worry, in hopes of being able to more clearly examine the effect that 
these human universals have on each other. 
 
The Construct of Faith 
Over the past 25 years Fowler (1981) has been one of the leading theorists 
concerning the development of faith.  Greatly influenced by psychological theorists 
such as Piaget (1928), Erikson (1950), and Kohlberg (1976), Fowler proposed faith as 
multifaceted and dynamically comprised of several domains of human existence.  He 
argues against a reduction of faith to a solitary construct, but understands it as the 
amalgamation of cognitive, affective and relational aspects (Parker, 2011).  Fowler and 
Dell’s (2006) definition of faith extends beyond religious faith and denomination.  It is 
“…characterized as an integral, centering process, underlying the formation of the 
beliefs, values, and meanings that:  1) Give coherence and direction to persons’ lives; 2) 
Link them in shared trusts and loyalties with others; 3) Ground their personal stances 
and communal loyalties in a sense of relatedness to a larger frame of reference; 4) 
Enable them to face and deal with the challenges of human life and death, relying on 
that which has the quality of ultimacy in their lives” (p. 36).  Throughout the literature, 
the terms faith and spirituality often are treated interchangeably.  While it may be 
argued that they are distinct constructs, the two are so intertwined that one could not be 
defined in the absence of the other.  It seemed most often to be the case that when the 
terms are used they are both attempting to capture the same elusive notion and that the 
greatest difference between them is one of semantics.  As the term “spiritual” or 
“spirituality” is used herein, it is taken to be a synonym for that universally human 
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process of engaging what one identifies as transcendent (ultimate) and making meaning 
using the same. 
Wilber (2006) described and defined the construct of spirituality as multi-
faceted and dynamic, simultaneously operating in both ascended stages and process 
states.  This idea presents spiritual development as progressing both horizontally and 
vertically. Wilber suggests the following six stages of vertical spiritual development: 1) 
Archaic; 2) Magic; 3) Mythic; 4) Rational; 5) Pluralistic; and 6) Integral. Along each 
line of horizontal development, he suggests that one travels through states on the way to 
the next stage.  The four designated states were: 1) Gross (natural world); 2) Subtle 
(deity); 3) Causal (Formless world); and 4) Nondual experience of reality.  Though 
these “integral” concepts aren’t further developed in the current review, suffice it to say 
that Wilber’s theoretical understanding of spiritual progression is one that leads to 
increasingly self-transcendent stages and states.  
Clore and Fitzgerald (2002) examined faith and its development as constructs 
and ultimately present an idea that seems to offer a blend of Fowler and Wilber.  They 
propose four distinct developmental pathways of faith: 1) Common Sense Faith; 2) 
Thoughtful Faith; 3) Responsible Faith; and 4) Transcendent Faith.  It is suggested that 
the second and third pathways lead to the fourth, “transcendental faith.”  They suggest 
that faith development is a knowledge-based construct; that is, that development is 
contingent on knowledge acquired and integrated into one’s thought processes.  Though 
they present their developmental model as unique and an alternative to Fowler’s stages 
(which it is), it does not fall far from the trajectory already outlined.  The researchers 
surveyed two samples.  One sample was 509 Roman Catholic parishioners and the other 
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was comprised of 303 undergraduate psychology students with ages ranging from 17-
84.  The researchers used a self-created 30-item faith development questionnaire to 
examine the current construct of interest, and they also examined aspects of attachment 
with a “self/other” survey.  They found a positive correlation between “common way” 
faith and age (older adults endorsed this stage at higher rates), and also a weaker 
positive correlation with “transcendence.”  Interestingly, they also found that “Self-
church” identification and scores on the “Other” index were significant and positively 
correlated to indications of “transcendent” faith.  The researchers suggest that faith, 
while having developmental aspects, is less clear than Fowler posits.  They state that 
faith development is a continually evolving knowledge-based integration and adaptation 
culminating with transcendence, but with some activity happening in all categories at all 
times.  Although Clore and Fitzgerald failed to find evidence for Fowler’s seven stages 
with their survey instrument, they were able to make comparisons to the older stage 
theory based on the four factors they found. 
Gibson (2004), theorizing about stages of specifically Christian spiritual 
maturity, equates the highest stages of his theory to Fowler’s stages five and six.  
Piedmont and Leach (2002) discuss spirituality as universal to the human experience 
and that it is manifested through a search for creating meaning.  Piedmont (1999) 
developed and factor analyzed the Spiritual Transcendence Scale (STS) and found a 
three-faceted single factor comprised of “prayer fulfillment” (joy and fulfillment from 
interaction with transcendent reality), “universality” (a sense of unity with all creation), 
and “connectedness” (sense of connection to life before and after one’s own).  
Consistent with Fowler’s (1996) emphasis on faith development culminating in 
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transcendence and Clore and Fitzgerald’s (2002) findings for what defines 
“transcendent” faith, Piedmont’s (1999) findings regarding what constitutes the notion 
of transcendence support and further specify the distinctiveness of the construct.  He 
used two samples of 379 and 355 people (balanced representation of males and females, 
ages ranged from 17-52, predominantly identified as “Christian”).  He used the first 
sample to develop the STS and the second sample to explore relationships of the 
domains of the STS to existing measures of personality, mental health, social 
connections, and faith maturity.  It was found that, in addition to the personal, 
individual nature of “prayer fulfillment”, the constructs of “connectedness” and 
“universality” were also statistically significant signifiers of “transcendence.”  These 
latter two aspects are fundamentally related to life extending beyond, and incorporating 
more than just one’s individually perceived troubles and struggles.  It is a recognition 
that life ultimately operates on a communal/relational [relationship to transcendent other 
(“God”), to other people, to nature] plane and that recognition and engagement on that 
plane is what constitutes transcendence. 
The ASPIRES scale was a development of Piedmont’s (1999) Spiritual 
Transcendence Scale (STS), taking its current form when he added the measurement of 
the Religious Sentiments domain in 2004.  The STS was based on the Five Factor 
Model (FFM) of personality, which contains the following five dimensions: 
Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992).  In his development of the STS, Piedmont sought to demonstrate that 
spiritual variables do represent something distinct from the five just mentioned, and so 
all STS items were analyzed within the context of the FFM.  Within this context, the 
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STS demonstrated a single overall construct comprised of items from the three 
previously mentioned facets: Connectedness, a belief one is part of an understanding of 
humanity larger than just themselves, which spans generations and groups; Universality, 
a belief in a uniting force and nature in life; and Prayer Fulfillment, personal feelings of 
joy and contentment experienced during personal encounters with a transcendent reality 
(Piedmont, et al., 2008).  The Religious Sentiments component of the ASPIRES scale 
examines frequency of involvement in religious activities. 
Williamson and Sandage (2009) focused on the notion of existential “questing” 
to demonstrate spiritual maturity.  They operationalized spirituality citing Hill et al. 
(2000), who define spirituality as a search and connection with the sacred (“the sacred” 
necessarily implying a transcendence of the self).  The identity development theorist 
Erik Erikson also theorized the notion of development moving forward towards 
transcendence of the self.  He, similar to Wilber, suggested that humans participated in 
a horizontal physical development while simultaneously developing vertically towards a 
transcendent reality (Hoare, 2009).  The existence of a positive correlational 
relationship between identity stage theory and spiritual (faith) maturity has been 
explored and demonstrated in the literature (Leak, 2009; Sanders, 1998; Watson & 
Morris, 2005).  It seems that many of these seemingly differing models of faith and 
faith development are related to each other, offering slight variations to try and explain 
this elusive construct.  They do, however, seem to have some major consistencies 
(primarily that of the end goal of universal transcendence) (Sinnott, 2005).  This allows 
for reasonable selection of one model for research purposes and also allows for some 
universality in discussion of results.  
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Fowler’s (1981) Stages of Faith 
Fowler (1981) proposed six post-language stages of faith and one pre-language 
stage of faith, taking place in infancy.  He identifies faith as the makeup of one’s main 
motivation for life (Green & Hoffman, 1989).  In agreement with most stage theories, 
Fowler postulates that once transition from one stage to the next has been accomplished, 
it is only in extremely rare cases that a person will regress to a previous stage.  He 
posits his theory as correlated to the stage theories of Piaget (1974) (stage theory of 
cognitive development), Kohlberg (1976; Kohlberg & Goslin, 1969) (stage theory of 
moral development), and Selman (1980) (stage theory of social perspective taking).  
Fowler identifies faith as a process of constitutive knowing, a meaning-making process 
that reflects our convictions, ultimate values, attachments, and unifying environmental 
contexts (Fowler, 1986).  He identifies one’s faith development, not as a process solely 
contingent upon one’s development in the other domains just discussed, but as a parallel 
and perhaps preceding process which provides the medium through and in which all is 
processed and integrated.  Fowler recognizes Erikson’s (1963) contribution to stage 
theory as well and places faith as a core component of ego development, a self-
constitutive activity incorporating and/or intertwined with all the lines of development 
discussed here. 
Following some of the other constructive stage theorists, Fowler states that there 
is an underlying structure to each stage.  This is akin to the stages and states of Wilbur 
(2006), which were previously discussed.  Fowler (1986) identifies seven operational 
structure components to each stage and suggests that each of these components is being 
developed concurrently with one’s faith.  They will be integrated and re-integrated at 
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each stage transition (Figure 1.0).  Transitions to stages are not accomplished 
uniformly, but rather, individuals transcend the various structural aspects at potentially 
different times leaving one’s stage status on more of a continuum as opposed to clear 
categorical designations. 
The seven aspects of the stage theory are: A) Form of Logic, this aspect follows 
Piaget’s cognitive stages and recognizes that higher levels of faith development 
correlate with higher levels of cognitive development; B) Role-Taking, this aspect relies 
on Selman’s social perspective-taking theory and acknowledges a movement from 
egocentricity to mutuality as one’s faith develops; C) Form of Moral Judgment, adapted 
from Kohlberg’s work, this aspect demonstrates the movement from 
concrete/reciprocally based morality to universal/loving stance; D) Bounds of Social 
Awareness, similar to perspective taking, this aspect is regarding who is included in 
one’s constituted identity and moves from self and similar others focused to a situating 
of the self in all humanity; E) Locus of Authority, this aspect concerns who or what an 
individual imbues with meaning-making authority and moves from superficial power 
structures to a recognition of multiple sources of wisdom and representations worthy of 
a place of authority; F) Form of World Coherence, this aspect represents how each 
stage’s meanings are unified and moves from a superficial/episodic unifying force to a 
recognition of the complex unifying threads connecting all of life; G) Symbolic 
Functioning, this aspect recognizes the use and power of symbol throughout the 
development of one’s faith.  It moves from a magical/distant use of symbols to a 
personal integration of the meaning the symbolic can provide. 
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These aspects are represented and manifested in differing ways with each faith 
stage.  Together they represent the complex make-up of the unifying construct of faith.  
The following is a summation of each stage taken from Fowler (1981; 1986): 
Primal faith.  This stage occurs in infancy and is marked by the beginnings of 
trust and loyalty in the infant’s conception of the world.  Power images begin to form to 
address the anxiety (attachment-related and otherwise) experienced at this time of life. 
 Stage one/intuitive-projective faith.  This stage is typically comprised of 
children between the ages of 3 and 7.  Children are particularly vulnerable to the actions 
of their primary adult role models during this phase.  Imitation and imagination are 
developed and are in the forefront of the child’s way of being.  A child in this stage is 
attracted to mystery and can “practice” comparing perspectives within the realm of the 
safety of concrete authority and power representatives.  Lasting emotional and cognitive 
imprints can occur at this stage, affecting the faith foundation, for better or worse.  This 
stage correlates with Piaget’s preoperational stage and Kohlberg’s punishment and 
obedience stage.  Among other things, new abilities of logical thought facilitate the 
transition to the next stage. 
 Stage two/mythic-literal faith.  This stage is marked with the internalizing of 
societal or familial beliefs.  The person takes on a more literal view of stories and the 
order of the world.  An understanding of justice and fairness is developed, but only in 
an elementary reciprocal way.  The person is still unable to develop personal meanings 
of things through reflection or conceptualizing, but relies on concrete power structures 
and story.  This stage correlates with Piaget’s concrete operational stage and 
Kohlberg’s instrumental exchange stage.  Transition from this phase is marked by 
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development of formal operational thought, and clashes between literal way of thinking 
and moments of reflective thought and reconsideration. 
 Stage three/synthetic-conventional faith.  Faith begins to be integrated into an 
identity in the world, and not just family.  This stage typically comes with mature 
adolescence and many adults ultimately stay here.  The stage is marked by the person’s 
thoughts now including others’ expectations and judgments, including God.  
Perspective taking takes on a significant role as the individual begins to focus on 
identity formation and questions of worth.  The stage correlates with Piaget’s early 
formal operations and primarily Kohlberg’s interpersonal concord stage.  Transition 
from this stage can be brought on by the questioning of traditional authority or a change 
in behavior or environment that brings on a more intense examination of what 
constitutes the self. 
 Stage four/individuative-reflective faith.  If undertaken at all, this stage most 
typically comes with young adulthood.  It is categorized by a separation of self-
responsibility from group.  A person in this stage could be seen as narcissistic in that 
there is much confidence placed on critical thinking and one’s own mind.  The process 
of developing a personal worldview and etiology for the processes by which one is 
surrounded is also a part of stage four.  It is in this stage that the critically thinking 
individual takes personal responsibility for creating meaning in his or her life.  There is 
a danger in this stage of deconstructing the mysterious (e.g., the unconscious) and 
special care must be taken not to do away with that which cannot be explained in the 
quest to exert a greater sense of control and autonomy.  This stage correlates with 
Piaget’s full formal operations and most significantly with Kohlberg’s social system 
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and conscience maintenance stage.  Transition from stage four occurs when one finds 
him or herself unsatisfied and restless with their world, which they had fit neatly into 
the box of their own minds.  A search for greater truth and internal sense of unity 
pushes people on to stage five. 
 Stage five/conjunctive faith.  This stage isn’t usually seen before mid-life.  Here 
one is seen to come back to re-integrating the imagination and mystery of stage one 
faith with the conscious capabilities of stage four faith.  The readiness to incorporate 
and aid in others’ ascension of the faith stages is present.  Paradox is embraced and 
dissimilar others are valued for the unique truth they may hold.  Whereas a stage three 
adult is necessarily defined by his or her own in-group, the stage five adherent 
recognizes that all people are in some way a part of their group.  They attempt to 
engage others without exclusion and by self-transcendent choice in a novel 
incorporation of previous stages.  However, a clash can be felt between a changed 
outlook on life and world that is unchanging and seemingly unexcited over this 
development.  It is this clash that can push one on to stage six, although it is quite rare.  
Fowler states this fifth stage requires an extension of Piaget’s formal operations to 
incorporate dialectical thinking.  He also states the stage correlates most strongly 
(though perhaps not exclusively) with Kohlberg’s prior rights and social contract or his 
universal ethical principles. 
 Stage six/universalizing faith.  Stage six is an abandonment of self to see the 
realization of a better world, as one was able to envision in stage five.  It has been 
described as a detachment, but is in actuality a transcendent attachment to what one has 
found to be the ultimate reality.  Identification with this brings about a renewed sense of 
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connectedness and a sense of responsibility that extends beyond the individual self, 
recognizing that the self only exists as a part of a larger whole.  Examples of potential 
stage six individuals judged by the transcendent tasks they set their lives towards are 
Mother Theresa, Gandhi, or Martin Luther King, Jr.  Fowler states no Piagetian stages 
go on to address this faith stage and that Kohlberg’s stage seven has some correlative 
traits. 
To some extent, to unearth the elusive notion of faith as described/theorized by 
Fowler and most others, the construct must be examined as “meaningfully relating.”  
How Fowler would describe one’s stage of faith seems to be directly correlated, at least 
in part, by how they respond to others, themselves, and the world at large.  Fowler 
posits his theory as developmental, which could easily leave one assuming that the only 
way to live life at peace is to ascend the rungs of his developmental ladder.  However, 
Fowler acknowledges in his initial text that equilibrium can also be found at lower-level 
stages.  In his text outlining the theory and offering empirical evidence for his stages, 
Fowler sampled 159 people ages 31-61+ (a range of over 30 years).  Within those ages, 
respondents primarily ranged from Stage three to Stage five, with a very small 
percentage (1.6%) identified at Stage six, and another small percentage (7.5%) 
identified at Stage two or Stage two-three transition.  His theory is developmental in 
that the later stages are not achieved without having first worked one’s way through the 
earlier stages, but even this description of later and earlier doesn’t aptly describe the 
notion of what the stages represent once one reaches a state of stage homeostasis (i.e., 
for a 60-yr-old who remains at what would be described as Stage two or three, to 
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describe their stance as “early” or “young” isn’t really accurate).  Faith is a process in 
action (Fowler & Keen, 1978) 
The traditional limiting of the construct of “faith” as synonymous to “religion” 
is also counter to Fowler’s definition of the term.  As previously discussed, faith is to be 
understood here as a universal construct.  Faith can be religious but isn’t by necessity.  
In his initial work on the subject, Fowler (1981) draws from philosophers such as Ernest 
Becker, Richard Neihbur, and Paul Tillich.  He emphasizes Man as inherently meaning-
making, stating that faith is a universal human concern (the ultimate concern) and is 
manifested in the ways in which people find unity and meaning in their lives.   
Faith according to Fowler (and for the purposes of this study) is to be 
understood in terms of a connection to and movement towards transcendence (ultimate 
environment).  In that movement, meaning is necessarily made, and thus, the construct 
of faith is also inseparable to that of meaning.  The subtitle of Fowler’s original work on 
the topic included the phrase “…and the quest for meaning.” 
Faith Development Measurement Issues 
Spiritual development has traditionally been defined different ways, such as: a 
person’s journey of transcending the self, in an effort to find their place in a world 
bigger than they are, or as the development of deep self-awareness that helps one 
understand him or herself concerning connectedness to others (King & Boyatzis, 2004).   
 As mentioned before, one of the most widely accepted theories of faith 
development is Fowler’s (1981) stages of faith theory.  Besides other theories which 
offer a totally different approach to faith development such as rational choice theory, 
which is the idea that religion only develops as it makes rational sense (McCullough, 
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Enders, Brion, & Jain, 2005), the argument in faith development tends to be concerned 
with how its different levels are determined.  It is accepted as a given that “faith” as it is 
here described is universally present and at work, whether or not it is rationally 
acknowledged and consciously/intentionally engaged.   
Streib (2005) asserts that rather than just measuring faith structurally, to be 
accurate, one should employ both an analysis of content and an assessment of one’s 
narrative of faith.  The difficulties lie in the feasibility and the ease with which each of 
these can be measured.  In a review by Parker (2006) basically every measure 
corresponding to Fowler’s stages was critiqued and found lacking in some way.  Each 
study in this field adds to the information against which measurement theories or 
approaches can be tested. 
Streib, Hood, and Klein (2010) introduced the Religious Schema Scale and 
suggested that Fowler’s theory was helpful but incomplete.  The authors suggested that 
what Fowler proposes as hard stage theory, is really more religious style.  Stage being 
defined more as operational structures coherent across domains, whereas style is more 
the repetitive use of a certain pattern.  Streib (2001, 2005) attempts a revision of 
Fowler’s developmental framework, hoping it would seem, to do a better job of 
explaining the components of faith (understood by Streib in the context of religion) and 
how they are arrived at and used by the individual in non-linear ways (i.e., people using 
aspects of multiple stages simultaneously).  The suggestion that faith stages are more 
aptly understood as the utilization of differing religious styles, would make it easier to 
explain how a 60-yr-old could remain at a stage 3, or possibly even a 2, and not be 
discontent.  However, the likelihood seems small that an elderly adult would not 
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encounter boundary experiences that would push the limits of what a stage 2 or 3 could 
adequately account for concerning meaning in life. 
 Another measure for assessing the construct is the Faith Development Scale 
(FDS), which was developed by Leak et al. (1999) as a measure of faith development 
correlating with Fowler’s stages two through five. Stages one and six were excluded 
due to the infrequency of encountering these stages in adults.  Reliability and validity 
reports have been confirmed in subsequent studies (Leak, 2009; Hart, Limke, & Budd, 
2010).  The measure is further described in a subsequent section. 
 
Meaning in Life 
 As was previously discussed, the construct of faith (as understood for the 
purposes of this study) by definition includes the concept of “meaning” (Fowler, 1981).  
Meaning has been specifically defined in a variety of ways but overarching themes tend 
to surround the presence of purpose and significance in comprehensive ways (Steger & 
Frazier, 2005).  Meaning is understood as something that is made or created on an 
individual level (Frankl, 1963).  Religion can serve as a modality through which 
meaning can be made but it doesn’t have to be the only way (Steger et al., 2010). 
 Steger, Oishi, and Kashdan (2009) examined the presence of meaning across the 
lifespan and suggested that meaning making is a developmental phenomenon.  They 
compared samples divided into four groups based on age (18-24, 25-44, 45-64, 65+) 
and found significant differences regarding self-reported levels of presence and search 
for meaning in individuals.  Presence of meaning was reported highest in the two older 
age groups.  Presence was reported lowest in the middle group (25-44).  A slight but 
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statistically significant decrease in presence of meaning was reported in moving from 
the 18-24 age group to the 25-44 age group.  Search for meaning was significantly 
higher among 18-44 year olds and then decreased in the older age groups.  The study 
found that presence of meaning was positively correlated to well-being, while searching 
for meaning in older adults was negatively correlated to well-being.   
The notion of meaning making as impacted by unique factors associated with 
developmental stage has been supported in other studies as well.  Hicks, Trent, Davis 
and King (2012) examined the impact of perception of future time (both in terms of 
literal time left to live as well as opportunities left to pursue goals).  They found that 
when physical time or future opportunity was seen as limited, meaning in life 
perceptions tended to be mediated by positive affect. That is, in perceived time-limited 
situations, when positive affect was low, perceived meaning was lower than if positive 
affect was high.  High positive affect seemed to have a stronger relationship to 
perceived meaning for older participants as opposed to a younger sample when 
recognition of limited time was a factor.  This was a four-part study.  Two parts 
indicated a strong correlation between meaning in life and positive affect.  One part 
indicated that the strength of positive affect as a predictor of meaning increased as time 
was increasingly seen as limited.  Overall, although of course causality cannot be 
established, these findings are supportive of the discussion earlier surrounding a deeper 
potential for meaning in older people perhaps related to the reality that they have had to 
make adjustments to their ability to make meaning in order to account for the inevitably 
higher number of boundary experiences they have encountered. 
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A study by Tavernier and Willoughby (2012) also supported this concept of 
boundary experiences creating the potential for deeper meaning.  They sampled a 
population of high school students who completed measures of well-being in 9th grade 
and then again in 12th grade.  A qualitative approach was used to determine the students 
experience of what the author’s describe as a “turning point” (defined as a significant 
life-changed event) during the time between data collection.  Based on students’ 
responses, it was determined whether the student had responded to the event in a 
meaning-making way.  Those students who had responded to their turning points in 
ways that included making meaning reported higher well-being than those students who 
did not report responding to their turning points in meaning making ways.  This is 
consistent with the previous study mentioned regarding positive affect being related to 
meaning in life. 
 Another study by Steger and Kashdan (2007) explored presence and search for 
meaning in life as a correlate to life satisfaction.  In a sample of undergraduate students 
testing at two separate points an average of 13 months apart, it was found that when 
students reported actively searching for meaning and finding it (indicated by 
endorsement of presence of meaning in life) that life satisfaction increased.  However, 
when students reported a high search for meaning but low perceived presence of 
meaning, life satisfaction decreased.   
 The studies reviewed above support the notion that a person who successfully 
engages the meaning-making process rather than despair in moments of stress would be 
more likely to report higher levels of well-being.  This state, by definition, would not be 
consistent with high levels of reported anxiety, and subsequently pathological worry.  
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One of the primary foci of the current review is concerned with how the construct of 
faith could impact worry.  As was previously discussed, faith is often confused with 
religion.  A study by Steger and Frazier (2005) provides some support for a separate 
function of meaning-making (faith) when compared with religiousness and religious 
activities as correlates to well-being. 
 The study found that reported presence of meaning in life mediated the positive 
correlation of both religiousness and daily religious activities to reported well-being (as 
assessed by measures of life satisfaction, self-esteem, and optimism).  This supports the 
notion that the construct of meaning and how one integrates it into his or her life is an 
important component of well-being and isn’t defined by religion, but instead may serve 
as a explanation as to what it is about religion on a universal level that tends to 
contribute to a greater sense of well-being. 
 Steger, Frazier, Oishi, and Kaler (2006) proposed a measure for assessing 
meaning in life they titled the Meaning In Life Questionnaire (MLQ).  They created the 
instrument as an alternative to other traditional meaning measuring scales such as the 
Purpose in Life Test (PIL; Crumbaugh & Maholick, 1964) and the Life Regard Index 
(LRI; Battista & Almond, 1973), which they describe as being frought with 
methodological deficits.  Their measure used a broad definition of meaning as “the 
sense made of, and significance felt regarding, the nature of one’s being and existence.”  
They report their measure is consistent with the notion that meaning is something 
constructed by the individual.  They found meaning to be a distinct construct 
demonstrating limited covariance with measures of well-being, as well as minimal 
correlations to religiosity, anxiety, depression, values or affect.  The instrument 
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measures both the presence of meaning people perceive in their lives as well as how 
engaged they are in the search for meaning. 
 When considered in the context of development (specifically faith 
development), the instrument could provide greater insight into what people are 
searching for when faith stage transitions are made.  It can also provide additional 
information when coupled with Self-Determination Theory (SDT) regarding the 
potential for greater objective depth in higher faith stages as well as how one could 
remain at a lower stage and be satisfied.  Just as SDT provides some basis for 
hypothesizing about why one might worry (basic need dissatisfaction/failure to operate 
in self-determined ways), the meaning literature may provide a way of describing what 
exactly is jeopardized by deficits in autonomy, competence, or relatedness.  When 
needs are dissatisfied one’s meaning-making potential is stymied and worry is again a 
logical consequence. 
 
Self-Determination Theory (SDT) 
While faith stage transition may not be a wholly conscious decision, as with 
most any developmental movement, an organism must contain an element of belief that 
they can step out of their comfort zone and move on to uncharted territory.  Ryan and 
Deci (2000a) have proposed a theory of motivation and personality that focuses on the 
notion of self-determination.  Underlying one’s level of self-determination is an 
acknowledgment of basic psychological need satisfaction as a prerequisite for optimal 
development (personality and social) and growth, as well as individual well-being.  
They posit that the three most basic psychological needs are that of autonomy, 
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competence, and relatedness.  When satisfied these needs have been shown to result in a 
greater sense of well-being (Reis, et al., 2000).  However, when thwarted, the 
dissatisfaction is suggested to lead to lower levels of personal well-being and even ill-
being. 
Autonomy is to be understood as acting from a place of recognized volition 
where one actively and intentionally endorses one’s actions.  It is often categorized as a 
detached individualism, which is not how it is to be understood in the context of SDT 
(Deci & Ryan, 2000). Competence represents a sense of self-efficacy and ability applied 
to many domains throughout the life span (Harter, 1978).  Relatedness is to be 
understood as a fundamental human need for deep, enduring relationships with others 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). The construct of autonomy as universal need seems to 
have been the most controversial of the three due to the perception that its relevance is 
only primary in the context of individualistic Western society (Iyengar & Devoe, 2003).  
However, Ryan and Deci (2006) address what they consider a misrepresentation of their 
construct of autonomy in re-emphasizing that autonomy is not detached individualism 
and independence.  They assert that even those coming from a collectivist context have 
the need to demonstrate autonomy in making personal choices guided by, for example, 
family or traditional values. 
SDT is concerned with examining the factors that seem to impact self-
motivation and growth as well as despair and stagnation.  Ryan and Deci (2000b) 
propose that SDT’s three basic needs are the driving force behind intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation as well as self-regulation within those states.  The authors state that their 
theory takes as a given humanity’s drive towards intrinsically motivated tasks (i.e., 
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tasks done for the inherent satisfaction provided by their completion).  Intrinsic 
motivation is fostered when one is experiencing autonomy, competence, and to a lesser 
extent, relatedness (i.e., self-determination).  However, the authors recognize that as one 
develops many if not most of the things they do are technically extrinsically motivated.  
They suggest that extrinsic motivation can vary in its levels of self-determination and 
internal regulation.  
Motivation is presented as continuum moving from amotivation to extrinsic 
motivation and then to internal motivation. Amotivation is non-regulated, has an 
impersonal locus of control, and is non-self-determined.  Intrinsic motivation is 
internally regulated, has an internal locus of control, and is self-determined.  Extrinsic 
motivation makes up the middle of the continuum with four different states representing 
differing levels of self-determination.  In a movement from less self-determined to more 
self-determined, the states are: external regulation, introjected regulation, identified 
regulation, and integrated regulation.  As movement occurs from external to integrated 
regulation, the locus of control moves from external to internal.  As the model indicates, 
a person can be externally motivated, but act from a place of internal regulation, thus 
acting autonomously despite external forces at play.  This model does not represent 
developmental stages.  Anyone can enter the model at any stage given their unique 
context and the task at hand.  However, as people age their life experience broadens, 
enabling them to hypothetically incorporate more into the self (Deci & Ryan, 2008b). 
SDT has been questioned regarding why the three needs identified are chosen 
over other potential needs (e.g., meaningfulness, safety/security, self-esteem) (Ryan & 
Deci, 2000b).  Particularly relevant to the current study is SDT’s connection to the 
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construct of meaning. The authors propose that rather than meaning in itself being a 
separate construct and need, meaning is experienced in the movement towards 
integration and internalization.  They propose that the most fundamental aspects of life 
people find to be meaningful will include:  their sense of ability to effectively navigate 
life’s varied situations with a degree of success/satisfaction (competence), their sense of 
personal volition in acting out one’s values and beliefs as they so choose (autonomy), 
and a recognition of connectedness to others, from close loved ones to all fellow 
humans (relatedness).  As satisfactory fulfillment of the three identified needs manifests 
in a person who is self-determined, a logical connection would be that a more self-
determined individual (have sufficiently satisfied needs for autonomy, competence and 
relatedness) has a greater potential for experiencing meaning in life. 
Deci and Ryan (2008a) propose that in order for a person to experience a life of 
satisfactory well-being all three needs must be satisfied.  SDT is specifically examined 
as a correlate to well-being defined by eudaimonia (Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008).  The 
authors elucidate distinctions between eudaimonic and hedonic well-being.  Hedonia is 
understood as the presence of pleasure and absence of pain; whereas engaging in 
meaningful activities and fully living out one’s potential characterize eudaimonia.  A 
state of eudaimonic functioning should result in an experience of pleasure.  As one’s 
basic needs are satisfied and one is able to pursue intrinsic goals a sense of eudaimonia 
should follow.  A sense of meaning and purpose in life is a logical consequence of 
eudaimonic living.  Worry would obviously be a negative correlate to well-being, and 
as worry is by definition the engagement of competence- and autonomy-questioning 
thoughts, it would seem that satisfaction of the basic psychological needs described here 
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would also result in decreased worry, although no studies were found directly 
examining the two constructs as correlates.   
From a faith development perspective, SDT provides some potential explanation 
as to why people could remain at seemingly lower levels of development (i.e., stage two 
or three versus four or five) and still maintain homeostatic levels of self-perceived 
meaning.  If one’s basic needs are satisfied at what Fowler (1981) describes as a stage 
two or three faith, then it would be expected the impetus to move on may not arise.  
However, when the typically inevitable boundary experience is encountered, one must 
adjust and grow or see well-being diminish (or in some cases compartmentalize or deny 
reality).   
The theory also provides additional information on what could be responsible 
for this growth and what drives one on to ascend the stages of faith development.  It 
provides some explanation as to why that progression could represent a deepening of 
one’s meaning-making model, as is suggested by Fowler’s model.  When one of the 
basic needs is thwarted in one’s life, in order for eudemonia to be regained, the deficit 
must be addressed.  Concerning one’s faith, if autonomy, competence, or relatedness is 
thwarted, it is most likely due to the discovery that one’s current model is inadequate in 
dealing with certain realities of life (e.g., the problem of pain in the world and one’s 
response, racism or hate as a part of one’s familial or cultural tradition, magical thinking 
that is challenged by reality, close-mindedness, etc.).  As adjustments are made, more of 
life is accounted for and integrated.  An internal sense of control is regained by pursuing 
one’s intrinsic growth tendency (Ryan & Deci, 2004).  This notion of control is not to 
be understood as control in the sense that one is able to manipulate and control all of 
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life’s variables, but that life can be identified with and integrated into the self in non-
need-threatening ways.  Although it would be difficult to measure one’s depth of 
meaning, as personal perception is a subjective construct, it would be logical to assume 
that this progression would result in greater potential for meaning.  Having this 
progression thwarted would obviously lend itself towards a greater potential for despair 
and ill-being. 
As one ages, it is more probable that they will encounter experiences and 
situations where basic needs could be thwarted, thus requiring an adjustment to regain 
homeostasis.  For this reason, it makes sense that there would be a higher proportion of 
older people in the higher faith stages, as they have grown and made basic need 
satisfaction adjustments, creating a more internal locus of control through identification 
and integration of new ideas and ways of understanding.  Older people remaining in a 
stage two or three faith would most likely have lower levels of need satisfaction (and 
subsequently lower perceived meaning) with higher levels of worry as it is more likely 
that they have failed in making necessary adjustments to address basic need deficits as 
they encountered situations that challenged their sense of autonomy, competency or 
relatedness.  A caveat is that due to the subjective experience of faith-challenging 
situations, it is hypothetically possible an older person could remain in a lower level not 
having had basic needs thwarted in their unique experience.  This unique, insulated 
experience would suggest there are ways of being in which one avoids or does not 
encounter situations challenging their sense of autonomy, competence, or relatedness. 
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Integration of the constructs relationship to worry: Faith stage development, Self 
Determination, and Meaning in Life 
 The preceding review has just outlined the primary constructs to be tested and 
explored with this study.  However, as has previously been mentioned and alluded to, 
these constructs all potentially present a sufficient amount of information for individual 
studies exceeding the length of the current one.  The four constructs have been chosen 
for a reason, as the current reviewer has found there to be a logical connection from one 
to the next. 
 In defining the term faith for the purposes of this study, it was indicated that it is 
fundamentally referring to one’s method of making meaning out of the events of life.  
This is in contrast to other understandings of the term such as “having faith in 
someone,” or understanding faith only as religion (although that begins to come closer 
to the present concept of the term).  So, one’s faith then becomes one’s unique response 
to the question, “What is meant by this?”  It has been suggested that the ability to 
answer this question is a universal pursuit (Frankl, 1955; Fabry, 1968).  Fowler’s faith 
stage theory presents a progression of movement in the foundation based upon which 
people arrive at their responses to this question.  For example, a person subscribing to a 
stage three faith will tend to answer the question in terms of how they see those they are 
connected to answering it (family, religious group, other in-group).  Their meaning is 
inseparable from approval/consistency with group affiliation.  In contrast, a stage four 
faith has the potential for a very different response than their “in-group.”  Although they 
may ultimately decide a similar response, it will have been decided more arduously and 
individually than the stage three respondent.  They will have critically analyzed their in-
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group response with personal experience and have made a decision internally consistent 
from an individual perspective. 
 The construct of meaning in life, to be measured by the MLQ, is a necessary 
component of the current review as it provides insight into how well one’s faith stage 
perspective is serving them.  What wasn’t found in the review of the faith stage 
development literature is whether or not different faith stages tend to lend themselves to 
differing levels of meaning, or whether certain stages have advantages or disadvantages 
over others in facilitation of the meaning-making process (i.e., do levels of meaning 
tend to be higher or lower between stages three, four, or five?).  It will be predicted in 
this study that differences in meaning will be seen between faith stages and that these 
differences are best understood in a discussion including the psychological need 
satisfaction model of Self-Determination Theory, to be discussed momentarily.  This 
notion of differing levels of meaning raises the questions: “What is the result of one’s 
faith stage being inadequately engaged?”, and “What are the effects when one’s process 
for making meaning in life is being thwarted?”   
Frankl (1955; 1958), May (1950), and, more recently, Yalom (2008) and Van 
Deurzen (2012) all attest to the connection, in theory and practice, between the 
constructs of meaning and anxiety, identifying them as negatively correlated by 
definition.  As was discussed in the section of this review on the construct of worry, the 
presence of worry is the primary feature of anxiety disorders.  This review goes on to 
highlight literature that not only provides the means for determining presence of 
pathological worry in general (PSWQ), but also the content of one’s worry (Boehnke, et 
al.’s (1998) theory of micro- and macro-worry).  The literature reviewed here suggests 
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that the content of one’s worry has a significant effect on one’s overall well-being, with 
the primary aspect of interest being the degree to which worry is focused on the self 
(micro vs. macro).  Faith’s proposed connection to meaning provides a logical 
connection to the construct of worry.  While one’s perceived ability to satisfactorily 
answer the universal question of “what is the meaning of this,” should demonstrate 
some predictive power over how much worry they experience, it doesn’t address the 
content of their worry.  Fowler’s faith stage progression seems logically fitted to 
provide some predictive power regarding this question of worry content.   
As has been previously outlined, the stages are a progression towards 
transcendence of the self (that being most fully engaged in stages five and six).  The 
theory seems to put forth a movement from micro to more macro with the stage two to 
three transition, then a temporary move back to a micro emphasis with transition to 
stage four, only to be followed by movement to stage five which has a macro emphasis 
to the greatest degree yet seen in the progression.  The difference in the macro emphasis 
between three and five is that stage three includes others outside the self only to the 
extent they are perceived as similar to or extensions of the self.  Also, at stage three 
locus of control is very much external, versus a more internal status with stage five.  
There seems to be a movement with Fowler’s theory of limited inclusion of others 
(stage three), to increased exclusion of others required to provide space needed to focus 
on self (stage four), but then back to unlimited acceptance/acknowledgment of others as 
well as self with stage five.  Direct correlations with worry content can logically be 
made with these considerations in mind. 
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Two aspects of faith stage development in particular point the current research 
in the direction of Self-Determination Theory as a core construct whose inclusion would 
serve the current investigation well.  While meaning has been identified as inseparable 
from the definition of faith here, the factor(s) that create the conditions for finding or 
identifying something as meaningful remains to be explained.  As was previously 
outlined in the section on SDT, it has been proposed that meaning is a bi-product of the 
satisfaction of one’s basic psychological needs (Ryan & Deci, 2000b).  If this is the 
case, then an examination of how respondents’ basic psychological needs are being met 
would help inform why certain stages may result in higher levels of reported meaning.  
Additionally, if it were to be found that, for example, stage five faith tends to result in 
greater reported need satisfaction than stage four, that provides some evidence for 
arguing the importance of continuing to actively engage the faith development process.   
SDT also addresses the importance of movement towards a more 
autonomous/intrinsically motivated stance in life.  This aspect of the theory is 
intricately intertwined not only with the faith stages outlined in Fowler’s theory 
(consider his discussion on Locus of Authority with each stage) but also with worry, 
specifically worry content (micro/macro).  Schwartz et al. (2000) suggest a possible 
explanation of why worry content differs (micro vs. macro) with respect to certain 
values, as they indicate that different values correlate to how extrinsically or 
intrinsically based one’s motivation is regarding the goal being pursued.  Another way 
of considering that idea is by considering SDT’s concept of autonomy.  The more 
autonomous one is, the less externally controlled and motivated they are, and thus the 
less prone they are to micro worry-based content dealing primarily with a perceived 
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inability to actualize (effect changes in one’s life as an individual).  However, this 
autonomy is only effective in combatting micro worry in so much as the need for 
relatedness is satisfied.  An overemphasis on autonomy to the detriment of relatedness 
(as may be seen in stage four faith) may well result in increased micro worry. 
Faith stage development is a way of articulating and summarizing one’s 
modality of making meaning and its potential for evolution over the life span.  While 
generalizable in its universal reality, meaning differs with respect to the individual in 
terms of its subjective content.  However, this variety of subjective meaning content is 
made more transparent by SDT’s indication of a general foundational prerequisite for 
all meaning satisfaction being the satisfactory meeting of one’s psychological needs.  
When one’s basic psychological needs are met the individual moves towards a place of 
autonomy and competence while still recognizing the importance of relationships.  
Development towards satisfying these three needs more fully is paralleled clearly in 
Fowler’s faith stage development.  Faith is the expression and engagement of meaning 
in one’s life, and a logical and literature-supported assumption is that in its absence or 
failure, the individual is vulnerable to anxiety and subsequently worry.  The literature 
supports the notion that worry’s presence as well as content (micro/macro) is 
significant.  Presence of meaning provides a source of prediction regarding presence of 
worry while faith stage (grounded in considerations of the correlated basic 
psychological needs and loci of authority/control) provides some predictive options 
regarding variations in worry content grounded in the concepts of micro and macro 
worry. 
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The proposed theoretical model integrating the constructs utilized in the current 
study is presented in figure form on the following page.  The figure represents the 
development from faith stages three to five, as those are the stages of interest for the 
current study.  A brief summary reminder of the content of these three stages is helpful 
in conceptualizing the model. An adherent to stage three has yet to critically examine 
their beliefs or values.  Stage three is marked by identification with one’s “in-group” 
and is understood as a conformist stage.  Stage four is realized when one begins to take 
personal responsibility for their beliefs and values.  In this stage, autonomy is 
emphasized, and the idea of self parts from stage three’s enmeshed understanding of 
others.  Connections to others are now marked by chosen ideological compatibility (as 
opposed to the inherited, unexamined connection to others marked by stage three).  
Movement to stage five discards the strict contrasts and distinctions of stage four and 
reclaims past connections.  It recognizes and honors the impact of stage three 
connections on current ways of being, while also using stage four autonomy to increase 
connections to both similar and dissimilar others. 
 As is noted on the left of the figure, self-transcendence rises from lower to 
higher stages and is accompanied by rising macro concerns (although a slight decrease 
in macro concern may occur with arrival at stage four, as was previously discussed, this 
temporary lull is overcome as movement toward stage five continues).   
Each stage is represented by unique satisfaction profiles of the three 
psychological needs (Autonomy, Competence, and Relatedness).  Each need has a 
separate bar indicating level of satisfaction, with movement to the right indicating 
greater satisfaction.  In addition, each bar shows gradients of universal potential fullness  
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Figure 3. Theoretical Model Integrating the Constructs 
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for each need (relatedness and autonomy increase in fullness as movement occurs from 
stage three to five).  This proposed fullness is theoretical, and an attempt is not made to 
measure it, as its subjective nature would make measurement quite difficult.  Speaking 
from a stage five or six perspective on relatedness (universal/global), one’s sense of 
relatedness in stage three is limited to their identified in-group.  Although the stage 
three adherent may self-report as satisfied regarding their exclusive connections, their 
satisfied sense of relatedness is not as inclusive, or full, as a satisfied sense of 
relatedness at stage five.  This increased fullness is also observed regarding autonomy, 
the reasoning having already been outlined in the stage descriptions just mentioned. 
The distinguishing features between stages regarding the three psychological 
needs profiled are as follows.  Stage three is marked by low satisfaction on autonomy 
contrasted by high satisfaction on relatedness, while competence hovers at mid-
satisfaction rates.  As satisfaction rates decline and subsequent dissatisfaction rates rise, 
one begins to search for new meaning.  When the dissatisfaction on autonomy within 
stage three is acknowledged by the individual, Search for Meaning in life increases and 
transition to stage four begins. 
Stage four is represented by an increase in autonomy potential and satisfaction.  
Changes in competence are not hypothesized, but it would not be surprising if increased 
autonomy resulted in some increase in competence.  The emphasis on autonomy and 
individuation at this stage results in decreased satisfaction on relatedness. Fullness, 
regarding relatedness, is not altered because the adherent simply exchanges his or her 
inherited in-group for a chosen one.  The individual does not expand his or her 
exclusive view of connection to others.  When deficient levels of satisfaction on 
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relatedness are realized, this dissatisfaction again drives the search for new meaning in 
life and the transition to stage five. 
Stage five is marked by increased fullness and satisfaction on all psychological 
needs.  Noteworthy is that one can potentially exist somewhat contentedly at any stage, 
but only to the extent they address, repress, or ignore any dissatisfied psychological 
needs.  Individual’s report of presence of meaning in life is defined by satisfaction on 
these three needs (to the extent they are experiencing satisfaction, meaning can be 
experienced; dissatisfaction impedes this experience). Levels of micro-focused 
pathological worry logically negatively correlate to presence of meaning and need 
satisfaction levels. 
The levels of dissatisfaction on autonomy and relatedness inhibit presence of 
meaning in stages three and four and also provide the foundation for increased worry.  
Stage five satisfaction levels provide the opportunity for increased presence of meaning 
and lower levels of worry.  Certainly, this development is more fluid than this static 
figure can adequately represent, but a visual representation of this complex construct 
interplay will hopefully prove helpful conceptually. 
 
Purpose 
 The current study seeks to build on previous worry and faith research through 
exploring the relationship between worry, faith development, meaning, and self-
determination theory.  Worry is understood as the anticipation of threat, which if in 
reaction to a real stressor can be a normal (state).  However, the term “threat” can be 
broadly and subjectively defined.  Chronic, uncontrollable worry (trait) is more 
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characteristic of a general state of despair, which would logically be addressed through 
engagement of meaning.  This connection provides a logical point of interest into how 
the two constructs actually interact.  As faith is presented here as framework of 
developmental stages, the question of what underlying factors are met as one moves 
through the stages is also of interest.   
This study presents four major constructs and suggests that they are intricately 
intertwined with one another; those four constructs being: worry, faith development 
meaning in life, and self-determination.  Admittedly, each of the constructs contains 
theoretical intraconstruct variance to the extent that studies have and will continue to be 
done within each of them individually.  However, it is inevitable that a limitation of 
intraconstruct research is that it will fail to explore the possible connections to other 
related theories that reciprocally impact the area of focus in a fashion similar to, for 
example, the biopsychosocial understanding of the individual.  Originally, the study was 
to examine specifically faith development according to Fowler’s (1981) stages and a 
global construct labeled “worry.”  However, as the constructs were researched, it 
quickly became apparent that the study would require in depth exploration of other 
constructs that are definitionally connected to the “how’s” and “why’s” of both the 
concept of worry and what Fowler proposes concerning what moves one along this 
continuum of faith, as well as what slows or impedes movement.   
Hypotheses in the current study will surround how one’s faith stage is related to 
their perception of meaning in life, and what impact faith stage and amount of perceived 
meaning has on the severity and content of people’s worries.  Reported self-
transcendence will be used to help further distinguish between faith stages. Underlying 
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faith and meaning, Self-Determination Theory will be explored as a related variable in 
explaining the presence or absence of meaning along the faith stage continuum.  SDT 
will also be explored as an impacting variable on the presence of worry. 
The current study will use a combination of measures to assess the severity and 
object of their worry, the developmental status of respondents’ faith, the perceived level 
of meaning in their lives, and how self-determined they understand themselves to be.  
As religious coping has been found to have an effect on certain psychosocial well-being 
variables, religious affiliation and involvement will also be assessed as well as other 
demographic variables (Pargament, 1997; Pargament, Smith, Koenig, & Perez, 1998).   
The idea of spirituality and meaning-making in the context of psychotherapy is 
one that continues to grow and develop (Myers & Williard, 2003; Parker, 2011).  
Hopefully, the findings of this study will benefit psychologists and psychotherapists as 
they attempt to help their clients with creating meaning in life and overcoming barriers 
to worry and anxiety.  The current research should also be beneficial to the faith 
community by educating and encouraging them to continue on with the work of helping 
people move away from the sickness that is a life of pathological worry and towards a 
more satisfying and meaning-filled existence. 
 
Hypotheses and research questions 
The primary criterion variable of interest is worry (both content and amount of 
worry).  It has been previously discussed that it is not the presence of general worry that 
is problematic but the presence of “pathological” worry.  In addition, the content of 
one’s worry has been argued to account for a significant portion of the variance 
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regarding the deleterious effects of the presence of worrying (i.e., micro worry is 
associated with negative outcomes versus a lack of impact on well-being associated 
with the presence of micro worry).  The PSWQ was utilized to measure the pathological 
nature of worry and Boehnke et al.’s (1998) Micro/Macro Worry Scale was used to 
assess worry content.  
In the section on Fowler’s (1981) stages, it was outlined how the stages differ 
(see Figure 2.0).  One area of difference of particular interest in the current study is how 
one exists in relation to others.  When considering Fowler’s stage aspects of Bounds of 
Social Awareness and Locus of Authority stages three, four and five demonstrate some 
noteworthy differences.  As movement from three to four takes place, one moves from 
identity being found primarily as a part of one’s in-group to identity being found within 
the self.  Movement from four to five then indicates a reintegration of self and others 
without the myopic exclusion of others characterized by stage three.  To categorize 
respondents by faith stage, it was planned that the FDS would be used in conjunction 
with the ASPIRES’ Self-transcendence subscale.  The FDS was to be use to separate 
respondents into a 2/3 and 4/5 groups.  The self-transcendence scale was then to be used 
to separate the stage four from stage five respondents using the midpoint of that scale’s 
range as a dividing point with higher levels of self-transcendence indicative of stage 
five and lower scores of stage four. It was hypothesized that faith stage would predict 
worry content with the highest amount of micro worry being found in stages three and 
four and the lowest being found in stage five.   
One explanation for why this difference was expected to be found was the 
hypothesized connection between these faith stages and SDT’s primary psychological 
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needs (autonomy, competence, and connectedness).  Based on Fowler’s description of 
the stages, a distinct psychological need satisfaction profile was expected to be 
demonstrated for each stage explored. It was hypothesized that the three faith stages 
explored will have distinct yet significantly consistent psychological needs satisfaction 
profiles when considering respondents’ results on the Balanced Measure of 
Psychological Needs (BMPN).  The current research expected to find that stage five 
faith would have consistently high overall satisfaction scores with elevated scores 
across all three need domains (autonomy, competence, and connectedness), stage four 
was expected to have elevations in autonomy and competence but lower scores on 
connectedness, and stage three was expected to see low scores overall, but specifically 
lower scores on autonomy than on competence and connectedness.  Respondents with 
scores low on autonomy and/or competence were expected to experience more micro 
(self- focused) worry, as they would perceive themselves as more at risk of having 
individual attempts at affecting change in themselves and/or their environment 
thwarted. 
As was previously mentioned, the concept of meaning has been identified as a 
construct whose potential is increasingly fostered as one satisfies his or her basic 
psychological needs and, in so doing, becomes more self-determined.  To be consistent 
with the SDT literature it was hypothesized that a prerequisite to presence of meaning in 
life would be satisfaction of one’s psychological needs.  However, to suggest such a 
hypothesis would be inconsistent with Fowler’s contention that lower faith stages can 
also achieve a state of contentment or homeostasis.  It would be logical to hypothesize 
that meaning would be predicted by need satisfaction and thus, a stage five faith was 
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expected to report a higher presence of meaning in life than a stage three, as they should 
experience greater overall need satisfaction.  This hypothesis, while logical when 
considering the SDT literature, contrasts Fowler’s assertion that a meaning-filled 
homeostatic existence can subjectively occur at lower faith stages (e.g., stage three).    
For these reasons, this issue was considered in an exploratory context in the current 
research.  The question of whether or not presence of meaning in life is significantly 
related to the satisfaction of psychological needs was posed as a research question.   
Presence of meaning, understood in part by definition to be the antithesis to 
despair, was hypothesized to predict the directional presence of pathological worry.  
This hypothesis was to be tested utilizing respondents’ scores on the MLQ-P and the 
PSWQ. 
To test Fowler’s assertion as a research question, meaning scores among faith 
stages was explored to see if stages predict consistently differing levels of meaning.  In 
addition, satisfaction of psychological needs was posited as a predictor of self-reported 
presence of meaning in life to test the assertion made by SDT researchers that the 
construct of meaning in life is a secondary by-product of psychological needs having 
been satisfactorily met. 
To summarize, the specific hypotheses for the current study were:  
(1) After having been categorized into faith stages (3, 4, or 5), it was expected 
for faith stages to significantly differ regarding content of worry.  Low scores on the 
FDS would be indicative of stage three faith where as high scores on the FDS would 
indicate stage four and five.  Stages four and five were to be separated by lower and 
higher scores, respectively, on the Self-Transcendence subscale of the ASPIRES.  When 
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comparing respondents, stage five respondents should have indicated lower scores of 
Micro worry than stage four or three respondents.  Macro worry on the other hand 
should increase throughout the stages as individuals shift focus from self to other.  
Specifically, Micro worry was predicted to be lower with stage five respondents 
compared to stages three and four (no prediction between stages three and four) and 
Macro worries should have been higher from stage to stage such that, 3 < 4 < 5. 
(2) Meaning, as indicated by the scores on the MLQ-P was predicted to 
significantly and negatively correlate with respondents’ report of pathological worry as 
represented by scores on the PSWQ.  Specifically, as MLQ-P scores increase, PSWQ 
scores were to decrease. Conversely MLQ-S scores should have positively correlated 
with PSWQ scores. 
(3a) Faith stages three, four, and five were expected to be represented by 
significantly distinct psychological needs profiles as represented by differences between 
faith stage groups on the subscales of the BMPN Scale for SDT.  Stage five was 
expected to have higher satisfaction scores on all three subscales of the BMPN 
(autonomy, competence, relatedness).  Stage four was expected to be high on autonomy 
and competence satisfaction but low on relatedness satisfaction.  Stage three was 
expected to be high on relatedness satisfaction but low on autonomy and possibly 
competence satisfaction (although for stage three competence could still be perceived as 
adequately satisfied despite deficiencies in satisfaction of autonomy).   
(3b) The findings regarding this hypothesis were to have implications with the 
first hypothesis (that faith stage would predict worry content), which if upheld, was to 
be tested alongside the current one to see whether faith stage is a better predictor than 
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satisfaction of psychological needs when considering worry content (i.e., Micro vs. 
Macro concerns).  It was hypothesized that BMPN subscales would be stronger 
predictors of worry content than FDS due to the hypothesis that the BMPN subscale 
categories represent concentrated, fundamental characteristics of the more broad, 
summative FDS groups. 
(4) Satisfaction of psychological needs was expected to predict presence of 
pathological worry, such that higher scores across subscales of the BMPN would 
significantly predict and negatively correlate with scores on the PSWQ (i.e., as scores 
on BMPN increase, scores on the PSWQ should decrease, and vice versa).   
Research questions to be explored were whether satisfaction of needs was 
significantly related to reported meaning in life (i.e., do scores on the BMPN correlate 
to scores on the MLQ), as well as whether faith stage differences result in increased or 
decreased scores on MLQ (i.e., were there significant differences in MLQ scores when 
comparing stage three, four, and five groups?).  The study also looked at evidence 
confirming findings of previous research, such as age and gender differences observed 
and previously reported levels of internal consistency on measures used. 
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Chapter 3: Methods 
 
Participants and Procedure 
Participants 
 As the constructs measured have been discussed as being experienced across the 
lifespan with differences noted across age groups, effort was made to recruit and 
include in the study a wide range of adult participants.  Participants between the ages of 
18 and 100 were recruited to participate in an Internet-based survey on “factors 
impacting worry” via email and social media using a snowball sampling method (i.e., 
respondents were asked to forward survey link to other potential participants; no 
compensation was given for forwarding the survey link).    This recruitment method 
was used in conjunction with direct requests to specifically chosen faith-based and 
secular groups to disseminate the survey link to their members.  It was hoped that taking 
advantage of the broadness and convenience of online connections would facilitate 
greater participation.  Participants were informed that they would have the opportunity, 
upon completion of the survey, to enter a drawing to win a $25 gift card.  The informed 
consent also noted that one gift card would be raffled for every 25 participants.  More 
detailed information regarding participant characteristics is noted in the results section 
of this study, and can also be found in Table 1 within the Appendices. 
Procedure 
 The study was reviewed and approved by the University of Oklahoma 
Institutional Review Board (IRB #3355).  Data collection took place via a secure web-
based server that housed the survey instruments.  Participants had to actively indicate 
they had read a research information sheet and consent to participate to enter the study.  
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If participants did not consent or indicated they were younger than 18 years of age they 
were thanked for their time and dismissed from the study. 
 Participants completed several demographics questions and the following 
surveys in this order: the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Myer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990), the Micro/Macro Worry Questionnaire (Boehnke et al., 1998), the 
Faith Development Scale (Leak et al., 1999), the Balanced Measure of Psychological 
Needs Scale (Sheldon & Hilpert, 2012), the Assessment of Spirituality and Religious 
Sentiments Scale- Short Form (Piedmont, 1999; 2004), and the Meaning in Life 
Questionnaire (Steger et al., 2006).  Surveys were given in the order described to try 
and avoid influence of faith questions on responses to worry questionnaires (i.e., 
participants primed with faith questions might be influenced on worry items, thinking 
that their faith “should” results in less or no worry).  Faith surveys were placed after 
worry measures but intermingled with measures of SDT and meaning, as items between 
those two constructs were not anticipated to cause significant priming issues.  After 
completion of all survey items (survey was set up in such a way that items could not be 
skipped), participants were invited to leave the survey by clicking a secure link to enter 
their email address for the $25 gift card drawing.  This was done to separate any 
identifying information from survey responses. 
 
Measures 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) (see Appendix 1).  
 The PSWQ was developed by Myer, Miller, Metzger, and Borkovec (1990) as a 
self-report measure of worry.  The measure has frequently been used in the diagnosis of 
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GAD (Brown, O’Leary, & Barlow, 2001; Campbell-Sills & Brown, 2010).  It is 
comprised of sixteen items to which participants respond using a Likert-type scale of 1 
(not at all typical of me) to 5 (very typical of me).  Eleven of the items are directionally 
positive in their relationship to pathological worry (e.g. “Once I start worrying, I cannot 
stop”).  Five items are reverse-coded (e.g. “I never worry about anything”).  After 
reverse scoring the five items and then summing all responses, a total score is used to 
reflect the presence of pathological worry in the respondent.  The total score is 
indicative of worry in that higher scores indicate higher levels of pathological worry.  
The PSWQ has demonstrated high internal consistency (alpha of .93) and good test-
retest reliability (.74 to .93 over a 1-month period).  For the current study, the PSWQ’s 
reliability was consistent with previous research (see Table 3).  It is anticipated that, 
regarding gender, females will score higher overall on this measure, as is consistent 
with previous research. However, this gender difference is not anticipated to confound 
findings related to the scale and is further discussed in the results and discussion 
sections (Conway, Wood, Dugas, & Pushkar, 2003; Robichaud, Dugas, & Conway, 
2003; Zlomke & Hahn, 2010). 
Micro/Macro Worry Scale (see Appendix 2)  
The scale for assessing presence of micro and macro worries was developed by 
Boehnke et al. (1998).  The authors extended Goldenring and Doctor’s (1986) scale 
concerning micro and macro existential worries.  This extension was justified by the 
authors due to the fact that the original twenty items were chosen from a list of self-
reported worries by a sample of high school students in 1986.  Boehnke et al. (1998) 
reported adding thirteen questions so as to include items from each of their identified 
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worry domains (safety and health, social relations, environment, economics, 
achievement, and meaning). This created a completed scale of thirty-three items. With 
each item, respondents are asked to consider: “How worried, if at all, am I about it?”  
Respondents then indicate their response using a 0 to 4 Likert-type scale labeled: “0” –
not at all worried, “2” –somewhat worried, “4” –extremely worried.  Examples of micro 
items would be “my getting cancer” (health domain), “my not having any close friends” 
(social relations domain), or “someone in my family not having enough money” 
(economic domain).  Examples of macro items would be “people in the world dying of 
hunger” (health domain), “conflict among groups in our society” (social relations), 
“many people in my country living in poverty” (economic domain).  The scale is made 
up of a micro and macro subscale (15 micro items and 18 macro items).  The authors 
did not provide a justification for the slight imbalance between numbers of items per 
subscale. 
The scale was initially constructed using Israeli, West German, and East 
German samples.  Cronbach’s alphas for the micro scale ranged from .81 to .87.  For the 
macro scale they ranged from .84 to .88.  Four-week interval test-retest correlations for 
the two scales were .84 for micro and .73 for macro.  Schwarz, Sagiv, and Boehnke 
(2000) used the scale on populations of East and West German, Israeli, and Russian-
born Israeli students and found Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .83 to .90 for the scales. 
Boehnke and Wong (2011) used a short version of the same scale by taking five 
items from both the micro and macro subscales.  Used with a sample longitudinally 
across 11 years, the authors found Cronbach alpha coefficients to range between .61 and 
.69.  Cronbach alphas for the macro scale ranged from .65 to .78.   
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Faith Development Scale (FDS) (see Appendix 3)   
The FDS was developed by Leak et al. (1999) as a measure of faith development 
correlating with Fowler’s stages two through five.  Stages one and six were excluded 
due to the infrequency of encountering these stages in adults.  The FDS is an eight 
paired-item forced-choice questionnaire.  With each question there is a less mature and 
more mature response.  An example of one of the paired-item questions is:  (a) “The 
religious traditions and beliefs I grew up with are very important to me and do not need 
changing,” (b) “The religious traditions and beliefs I grew up with have become less 
and less relevant to my current religious orientation.”  Selection (b) represents the more 
mature faith development.  The number of more mature faith responses does not reflect 
directly the corresponding stage of the participant.  For example, if a participant chose 
the more mature statement five of the eight times a stage five development would not be 
inferred.  The FDS yields only a range of faith development with the higher scores 
correlating to stages four or five and the lower scores to stages two or three.  The 
questionnaire is scored by counting the number of times a respondent chooses the more 
mature faith development response.  Scores range from 0 to 8 with scores at or below 
“4” being representative of lower developmental stage (Fowler stage 2-3) and scores 
above “4” being indicative of a higher developmental stage (Fowler stage 4-5). Leak et 
al. (1999) reported an internal consistency with an alpha of .72 and a five-week test-
retest reliability rating of .96.  Leak (2003) subsequently examines the scale’s validity 
from a cross-sectional and longitudinal perspective noting significant differences on 
FDS scores in sample of college freshman and seniors.  In a 2008 study, Leak further 
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examines the scale’s factorial validity and presents satisfactory evidence for the good fit 
of a single factor.  Convergent validity is also demonstrated between studies. 
Balanced Measure of Psychological Needs Scale (BMPN) (see Appendix 4) 
An initial version of the BMPN was used by Sheldon and Gunz (2009; Sheldon 
et al., 2011) as an alternative to the Basic Psychological Needs Scale (BPNS) (Gange, 
2003).  Due to perceived problems with the BNPS (i.e., internal and construct validity 
issues), the scale was formally presented in its current form by Sheldon and Hilpert 
(2012).  Items for the scale included a previously validated nine-item measure in 
addition to nine newly formulated items, totaling eighteen items.  The addition of items 
was done to balance out the subscales as well as to provide scores of both satisfaction 
and dissatisfaction (as opposed to just an overall score) on the three distinct subscales 
representing the three basic psychological needs, as outlined in Self-Determination 
Theory (Autonomy, Competence, and Relatedness); (Deci & Ryan, 2000).  Each need is 
represented by six questions (three satisfaction and three dissatisfaction) with a mixture 
of positively and negatively worded items.  The reported reliabilities for the BMPN 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction subscales respectively were, .69 and .72 on autonomy, 
.71 and .70 on competence, and .71 and .85 on relatedness (Sheldon & Hilpert, 2012). 
 One limitation of the scale is that it seems to have been validated and used 
primarily with undergraduate students, and cross-cultural validity/consistency data is 
lacking.  However, the core assertions of self-determination theory have been 
demonstrated to be applicable in a multi-cultural context (Roth et al., 2006; Chirkov et 
al., 2003; Grouzet et al., 2005).  Although fewer field studies have been done using the 
scale, according to the authors the BMPN is a significant improvement over the more 
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widely used BPNS, addressing issues including: unbalanced subscales, lack of 
negatively worded items, improved internal and construct validity  (Sheldon & Hilpert, 
2012). 
 The BMPN is an 18-item scale comprised of three dual-faceted 
(satisfaction/dissatisfaction) subscales.  Administration of the scale yields a satisfaction 
and dissatisfaction score for each of the three subscales (Autonomy, Competence, and 
Relatedness).  Satisfaction and dissatisfaction scores can be combined for an overall 
satisfaction score.  Respondents are asked to read a series of statements about 
themselves and “think about how true it is for you.”  A 5-point Likert-type scale is used 
with “1” being “not at all true for me”, “3” being “somewhat true for me”, and “5” 
being “very much true for me.”  The following are example questions from each 
subscale: “I feel a sense of contact with people who care for me and whom I care for” 
(Relatedness), “I successfully complete difficult tasks and projects” (Competence), and 
“I am free to do things my own way” (Autonomy).  Scores on each subscale are then 
summed (satisfaction and dissatisfaction components can be combined for an overall 
satisfaction score) and indicate level of satisfaction pertaining to each of the three 
psychological needs, such that higher scores indicate higher perceived levels of 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction.  Reliability coefficients for the current study can be found in 
Table 3.  Due to the low number of items per subscale (six subscales of three items 
each) possibly impacting the reported Cronbach values, the mean inter-item correlation 
is also reported.  Briggs and Cheek (1986) recommend a range of .20 to .40.  Of the 
three subscales with alpha values below .70, they all fell within the recommended 
average inter-item correlation range (relat_diss = .39, aut_sat = .39, aut_diss = .34). 
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Assessment of Spirituality and Religious Sentiments Scale- Short Form (ASPIRES-SF) 
(see Appendix 5) 
 The ASPIRES-SF is a 13-item measure (the full ASPIRES contains 35 items) 
developed by Piedmont (1999; 2004).  The first four items comprise the Religiosity 
Index.  Participants are asked to rate how often they: “…read the 
Bible/Torah/Koran/Geeta; …read other religious literature; …pray; and,  …attend 
religious services.”  Respondents rate themselves on a Likert-type scale of 1 (Never) to 
7 (Several times a week).  The sum of the transformed z-score responses provides a 
composite measure of religious involvement.  The remaining nine items examine the 
three identified facets of spiritual transcendence (e.g., “In the quiet of my prayers and/or 
meditations, I find a sense of wholeness”; “I feel that on a higher level all of us share a 
common bond”).  Participants rate themselves on a Likert-type scale of 1 (Strongly 
agree) to 5 (Strongly disagree).  Individuals scoring high on this dimension are 
suggested to derive a greater sense of meaning from a wider context (nature and/or 
community), whereas low-scoring individuals are suggested to be more materially-
oriented and focused on the physical realities of the present.  The measure comes in a 
both a self-report and observer form; significant correlations of .81 to .96 were reported 
between long and short forms. As the long and short forms did not differ significantly 
regarding reliability, and this study was comprised of multiple self-report measures, the 
short form was chosen for the current study to decrease overall survey length, hopefully 
improving survey completion and participant retention rates.  Only the self-report 
measure will be used for the current study and alphas for the short form were reported 
to range from .60 to .92 across all subscales of the form querying both community and 
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student samples (Piedmont, et al., 2008).  The measure also includes a demographic 
component requesting: gender, age, race, and religious affiliation.  The current study 
yielded the following Cronbach alpha coefficients:  prayer fulfillment = .92, 
connectedness = .76, universality = .52 (mean inter-item correlation = .28), 
transcendence total score = .78. 
The measure and its model have also demonstrated validity and reliability in 
cross-cultural samples (Piedmont, 2007; Piedmont, Werdel, & Fernando, 2009; Rican & 
Janosova, 2010).  Rican and Janosova’s (2010) study with youth in the Czech Republic 
demonstrates support for the structure of the STS and acceptable or explainable 
correlations to the domains of the STS.   The STS demonstrates comparable, acceptable 
reliability and validity statistics when a translated version is used with Filipino adults 
(Dy-Liacco, Kennedy, Parker, & Piedmont, 2006; Piedmont, 2006; 2007).  Piedmont, 
Werdel, and Fernando (2009) used the ASPIRES to compare a Sri Lankan sample and 
found that the scale proposed comparable and acceptable reliability and validity 
between the two groups.  Leach, Piedmont, and Monteiro (2001) also looked at the 
STS’s applicability in India among Christian, Hindu, and Muslim samples, and found 
the scale to be applicable and appropriate in these settings. 
Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MLQ) (see Appendix 6) 
The MLQ was developed by Steger et al. (2006).  The scale consists of two 5-
item subscales.  One measures the perceived presence of meaning in life (MLQ-P) (e.g., 
“my life has a clear sense of purpose,” “I understand my life’s meaning”).  The other 
measures search for meaning in life (MLQ-S) (e.g., “I am always looking to find life’s 
purpose,” “I am searching for meaning in my life”).  Respondents rate items on a 7-
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point Likert-type scale ranging from: 1 (absolutely untrue) to 7 (absolutely true).  
Scores on each subscale can range from 7-35 with higher scores representing greater 
presence of or search for meaning in life.  In the initial study, internal consistency was 
good with alphas for ranging from .81 to .86 for the MLQ-P subscale and .84 to .92 for 
the MLQ-S subscale.  One-month test-retest reliability was also good (MLQ-P=.70 and 
MLQ-S =.73).  When compared to other meaning scales measuring presence of 
meaning good convergent validity was found for the presence subscale (MLQ-P).  The 
MLQ demonstrated good discriminant validity when compared to measures of social 
desirability, values, and extrinsic religiosity.  Internal consistency and stability for the 
scale has been demonstrated in subsequent studies and supports the use of the scale in 
its current form (Steger & Kashdan, 2007; Steger et al., 2010).  There is evidence to 
support its cross-cultural reliability with its use with Hispanic and Japanese respondents 
and in both out and in-patient settings (Schulenberg, Strack, & Buchanan, 2011; Steger, 
Frazier, et al., 2008; Steger, Kawabata, et al. 2008).  For the current study, the MLQ-P 
and MLQ-S subscales demonstrated good reliability (see Table 3). 
 
Design 
Hypothesis one 
 Hypothesis one was tested by categorizing FDS respondents into High and Low 
groups and then further categorizing the “high” group based on STS score (which were 
expected to negatively correlate with FDS).  This was to result in three faith stage 
groups (3, 4, and 5) that could be compared. A multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA), using Hotelling’s Trace due to having only two groups, was used to test 
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differences between groups on the Micro/Macro worry subscales as well as the measure 
of pathological worry (PSWQ).  Also included in this omnibus test were the six 
subscales of the balanced measure of psychological needs to test hypothesis 3a.  After 
Bonferroni adjustment to reduce chances of Type 1 error, significant differences were 
marked by significance levels <.006, unless otherwise noted. 
Hypothesis two 
Hypothesis two was tested using a general Pearson correlation to test for 
significant relationships between search for meaning in life (MLQ-S) and presence of 
meaning in life (MLQ-P) with scores on the PSWQ. 
Hypothesis three 
 Hypothesis 3a was tested as described above using the Hotelling’s Trace value 
obtained from a MANOVA.  Differences on BMPN satisfaction/dissatisfaction 
subscales were tested for significance between faith stage groups.  To test hypothesis 
3b, a standard multiple regression analysis was used to see if scores on the BMPN 
accounted for more variance on the Micro/Macro worry scale (worry content) than 
scores on the FDS. 
Hypothesis four and Research Questions 
 A standard multiple regression analysis was also used for hypothesis four to test 
the BMPN subscales as significant predictors of scores on the PSWQ.  Research 
questions were addressed using Pearson product-moment correlations to explore 
relationships between variables. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
 
As only completed surveys were included in data analysis, there were no 
missing data for which to account during analysis.  Power estimates were conducted for 
proposed analyses with G Power 3 power analysis software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007).  Power analyses combined with the literature review of previous 
studies with same instruments and similar analyses prior to collection indicated the need 
for 150-200 participants in order to yield adequate power for all analyses planned 
(which was surpassed with the size of the current sample).  Cohen’s (1992) 
recommended power level of .80 and at least a “medium” effect size.  These 
recommendations were used as guidance for the current study.  Preliminary analyses 
testing for normality on variables were within acceptable limits.  No extreme outliers 
were indicated. 
 
Participants 
The final sample was comprised of 264 completed surveys.  Of the individuals 
who initiated the survey, 38 did not complete it and were not included in final sample.  
Due to the online design of the survey, participants could not skip items but were 
required to answer every item as long as they chose to continue the survey.  It appeared 
that 38 individuals abandoned the survey (i.e., they initiated the survey but did not 
complete it).  Upon inspection of the 38 who discontinued the survey, it was observed 
that participants discontinued participation at various points in the survey (some early 
on and others after completing several measures). No consistent demographic pattern 
was observed as discontinuing participants demographic data was consistent with 
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sample of completed surveys. Additionally, if after connecting to the survey link 
participants declined the informed consent or reported being under 18 years of age they 
were not allowed to participate in the survey.  These individuals who did not consent or 
did not meet inclusion parameters were also included in this sample of 38 who did not 
complete the survey.  
Within the sample, there were 191 women (72.3%) and 73 men (27.7%).  No 
significant mean differences between genders were found on any measures completed 
except the measure of pathological worry (PSWQ), which will be further discussed later 
in this section. Ages ranged from 19 to 79 with a mean reported age of 38.6 years 
(standard deviation SD = 14.3).  The large majority (85.2% of the sample) were in a 
range of ages from 19 to 57. Within that subsample (N=225), 61% were between the 
ages of 20 and 34. The majority of respondents reported being Caucasian/White 
(86.7%) and, when asked about religious orientation, Christian (73.5%).  See Table 1.0 
for complete demographic variables. 
Regarding religious involvement, 41.1% of the sample reported reading 
religious texts (e.g., Bible, Torah, Koran, Gita) weekly or multiple times per week. Of 
those reported readers, 11.3% reported reading monthly, 26.5% yearly, and 22% 
reported never reading said texts.  Participants were also asked how often they read 
religious literature other than the previous four texts mentioned.  Within those results, 
60.2% reported a range of several times per year to never, while 23.8% reported reading 
weekly.  Regarding prayer, 67.4% of the sample reported praying at least weekly, 9.8% 
reported praying at once to several times per year, and 12.5% reported never praying.  
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Concerning religious service attendance, 42.8% reported attending services weekly, 
9.5% monthly, 27.3% yearly, and 20.5% reported never attending religious services. 
 
Measures 
Regarding worry, participants’ scores on the PSWQ ranged from 16 to 80 with 
an average score of 48.61 (SD = 15.36).  On the Micro/Macro Worry Scale, the micro 
worry subscale ranged from 16 to 68 with a mean of 36.56 (SD = 10.72), while the 
macro worry subscale had slightly higher mean of 41.50 (SD = 12.27).  Independent-
samples t-test revealed significant differences on worry between males (M = 42.16, SD 
= 15.25) and females (M = 51.07, SD = 14.71) on the PSWQ (t (262) = -4.36, p < .01).  
The effect size of the mean difference was moderate (eta squared = .07).  This 
difference between males and females on the PSWQ is consistent with previous 
research and was anticipated with this study.  It is presented here as confirmation of 
consistency with prior research and should not confound other findings in this study, 
considering no other significant gender differences were found within any other 
constructs measured (Conway, et. al., 2003; Meyer et al., 1990; Robichaud et al., 2003; 
Zlomke & Hahn, 2010). 
Scores on the faith development scale ranged from 0 to 8 with a mean of 5.54 
(SD = 1.94).  On the FDS, 28.8% of the sample scored at or below a 4, indicating 
endorsement of a lower faith development stage.  A relatively balanced percentage of 
the remaining sample were spread across the other possible scores 5-8 indicating a 
higher faith development stage (between 42-50 respondents per score, 16%-19%).  
Total spiritual transcendence scores on the ASPIRES-SF ranged from 9 to 45 with a 
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mean score of 33.31 (SD = 6.31).  Scores on the Prayer Fulfillment, Connectedness, and 
Universality subscales of the ASPIRES ranged from 3 to 15 and had average scores of 
11.77, 10.43, and 11.11, respectively.  Religiosity subscale scores from the ASPIRES 
were reported above with the demographic information. 
Participants’ scores were relatively consistent across each of the BMPNS 
subscales: Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction on Relatedness, Competence, and Autonomy.  
Possible scores on each scale ranged from 3-15, such that higher scores indicated 
greater degrees of satisfaction or dissatisfaction and lower scores indicated the contrary.  
For the Relatedness subscale, satisfaction had a mean score of 12.18 (SD = 2.48,) and 
dissatisfaction had a mean score of 6.91 (SD = 2.74).  Regarding Competence, means 
scores were: satisfaction, M = 11.69 (SD = 2.32) and dissatisfaction, M = 7.71 (SD = 
2.99).  The scores on the Autonomy subscale were similar to the other two subscales for 
both satisfaction, M = 11.30 (SD = 11.30), and dissatisfaction, M = 7.84 (SD = 2.67). 
In the current study, MLQ scores ranged from 5 to 35 (scale’s actual range: 0-
40).  The average score for MLQ-Presence was 26.24 (SD = 6.83) which was slightly 
above the midpoint (20).  The MLQ-Search average was 20.39 (SD = 8.09).  These 
numbers are relatively consistent with (slightly above for the (MLQ-P P) and below for 
the (MLQ-S) previously reported scores on these measures (Steger et al., 2006).  
 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis one 
 Hypothesis one originally included dividing faith development scale (FDS) 
scores into three stage groups using scores on the STS(transcendence subscale of the 
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ASPIRES-SF), and then compare the groups on worry, expecting low faith stage groups 
to have significantly higher levels of pathological (PSWQ) and micro worry.  The high 
faith stage group was anticipated to demonstrate significantly lower levels of 
pathological and micro worry but higher levels of macro worry. Using SPSS, FDS 
scores were categorized into “high” (≥5) (N = 188) and “low” (≤4) (N = 76) based on 
earlier justification regarding cutoff levels for faith stage categorization (Fowler stage 
2-3 for “low” group and 4-5 for “high” group).  Originally, STS scores were then to be 
used to divide the high FDS group into two separate groups.  However, upon initial 
analyses between the two measures, it was revealed by the Pearson product-moment 
correlation that the relationships between scores on the FDS and STS had a small to 
medium negative correlation, r = -.27, n = 264, p < .01, with higher scores on the FDS 
associated with lower scores on the STS (spiritual transcendence).  This finding was in 
contrast to the originally anticipated positive correlation of the two variables and thus 
did not provide the variable scores needed to further divide FDS scores from two groups 
to three.  Because the FDS groups could not be separated into three groups, a 
MANOVA using the Hotelling’s Trace values was used to compare the high and low 
FDS groups.   
Tests for homogeneity and equality of variances, normality, linearity, and 
multicollinearity indicated assumptions were not violated in this test.  There was a 
statistically significant difference between high and low FDS groups on the combined 
dependent variables (pathological, micro and macro worry, and the six BMPN 
subscales), F (9, 254) = 3.301, p = .001; Hotelling’s Trace = .117; partial eta squared = 
.105. When the results for the dependent variables were considered separately, the only 
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differences to reach statistical significance regarding this hypothesis, using a Bonferroni 
adjusted alpha level of .006, was Micro worry, F (1, 262) = 9.151, p = .003, partial eta 
squared = .034.  An inspection of the mean scores indicated that the high FDS group (M 
= 37.81, SD = 10.35) had higher scores on micro worry than the low FDS group (M = 
33.47, SD = 11.05). 
Noteworthy is that, while statistically insignificant in the current model due to 
the Bonferroni adjustment, groups also differed on pathological worry scores (p = .046) 
in an unanticipated direction with the high FDS group (M = 49.80, SD = 15.50) scoring 
higher than the low FDS group (M = 45.64, SD = 14.69). Macro worry scores differed 
in the hypothesized direction with the high FDS group (M = 42.78, SD = 11.64) scoring 
higher than the low FDS group (M = 38.34, SD = 12.32). However, this difference on 
macro worry (p =.008) could not be considered statistically significant under the current 
parameters with the Bonferroni-adjusted  p value of .006. 
The first hypothesis was only partially upheld in that it could not be fully tested 
as originally intended (comparison of three faith stage groups) due to the failure of the 
STS to correlate with the FDS as hypothesized.  Additionally, even when faith stage 
was divided into two groups (FDS high and low), significant differences were found in 
the opposite direction as originally hypothesized (lower faith stage was characterized by 
lower PSWQ and Micro worry subscale scores than worry scores within high faith stage 
group).  Macro worry did differ in the direction hypothesized, which was that the higher 
faith stage group had a significantly higher Macro worry subscale score than the lower 
faith stage group, but did not demonstrate a statistically significant difference. 
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Hypothesis two 
The null was rejected for both aspects of hypothesis two.  Both subscales of the 
MLQ had a significant relationship with scores on the PSWQ.  These relationships were 
in the direction hypothesized.  A negative correlation existed between reported presence 
of meaning in life (MLQ-P) and pathological worry (PSWQ), r = -.25, n = 264, p < .01.  
Higher levels of reported presence of meaning in life were associated with lower levels 
of pathological worry.  Regarding search for meaning in life (MLQ-S), a positive 
correlational relationship was found between it and pathological worry, r = .27, n = 
264, p < .01.  Thus, higher levels of reported searching for meaning in life were 
associated with higher levels of pathological worry.  The r values (-.25 & .27) suggest 
both relationships had a small effect size according to Cohen’s (1988) 
recommendations. 
Hypothesis three (part one) 
Again the testing of this hypothesis had to be altered from the original design as 
faith stage groups were only divided into two groups rather than three. This hypothesis 
was tested using the MANOVA run in hypothesis one to reduce chance of Type 1 error.  
The Hotelling’s Trace value was used due to only comparing two groups. The omnibus 
test including all dependent variables did indicate significant differences between 
groups, F (9, 254) = 3.301, p = .001; Hotelling’s Trace = .117; partial eta squared = 
.105. When the six dependent variables included in this hypothesis were considered 
separately, the only differences to reach statistical significance, using a Bonferroni 
adjusted alpha level of .006, were Relatedness Dissatisfaction, F (1, 262) = 9.711, p = 
.002, partial eta squared = .036; and Autonomy Dissatisfaction, F (1, 262) = 17.488, p < 
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.001, partial eta squared = .063.  Competence Dissatisfaction neared signficance (p = 
.008). 
Interestingly, mean differences (statistically significant differences on 
Autonomy and Relatedness Dissatisfaction) were found between high and low faith 
stage groups on all dissatisfaction subscales but not satisfaction subscales.  Mean 
differences on satisfaction scores for all three subscales were nearly indistinguishable 
(within 0.5 points between groups).   
To the extent it could be tested in its two-group form, the hypothesis that higher 
faith stages would benefit from higher satisfaction levels on autonomy and competence 
was not upheld and the null failed to be rejected.  Regarding competence dissatisfaction, 
the lower faith stage group (M = 6.95, SD = 2.45) had a lower mean than the higher 
faith stage group (M = 8.02, SD = 3.14), but this difference was not statistically 
significant with the current Bonferroni-adjusted p value of .006. Autonomy 
dissatisfaction demonstrated the largest mean difference between low (M = 6.79, SD = 
2.55) and high (M = 8.26, SD = 2.60) faith stage groups.  This difference was 
statistically significant and had the largest effect size of any difference tested between 
groups regarding this with a medium effect size (partial eta squared = .63). 
Consistent with the original hypothesis was that relatedness dissatisfaction 
would be higher for stage four faith than it would for stage three.  Being unable to 
differentiate between Fowler stages four and five, the fact that the higher faith stage 
group (M = 7.23, SD = 2.78) had a higher level of relatedness dissatisfaction than the 
lower faith stage group (M = 6.09, SD = 2.47), partially upholds the hypothesis with a 
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small to medium effect size (although it cannot be fully tested due to an inability to 
differentiate between stages in the higher faith stage group), partial eta squared = .036 . 
Hypothesis three (part two) 
This hypothesis was concerned with the prediction of worry content 
(macro/micro) by FDS and BMPN scale scores.  It was predicted that, though both 
measures should offer some significant predictive power, the BMPN subscales would 
account for a larger portion of the variance in the model.  Two standard linear 
regressions were used to test the two models (one predicting macro worry, the other 
predicting micro worry).  No assumption violations were noted.  With Micro Worry as 
the first criterion variable, the FDS and the six BMPN subscales were included in the 
model as predictors. 
The total model was found to significantly predict Micro Worry in the sample, 
and explained 23.8% of the variance in the criterion variable (small to medium effect 
size) (R2 = .258, adjusted R2 = .238, F(7, 256) = 12.737, p < 0.001).  Of the included 
predictors, standardized Beta weights for the two significant predictors were β = .322 
for BMPN subscale Relatedness Dissatisfaction (t = 4.577, p < .01) and β = .113 for the 
FDS (t = 2.013, p < .05).  In partial support of this hypothesis, FDS stood as a 
significant but weak predictor, but in the opposite correlational direction than was 
anticipated (r = .187). Of all the BMPN subscales, Relatedness Dissatisfaction was the 
only one that significantly predicted Micro Worry (r = .447), such that for every one SD 
increase in Relatedness Dissatisfaction, Micro Worry should also increase .32 standard 
deviation units. 
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When performing the same analysis for the Macro Worry subscale, model 
significance was also found but with a smaller effect size (R2 = .089, adjusted R2 = .064, 
F(7, 256) = 3.553, p = 0.001).  Of the included predictors, Relatedness Dissatisfaction 
(β = .199, t = 2.550, p = .01) and FDS (β = .165, t = 2.642, p < .01) were again 
significant predictors, but were also joined by Competence Satisfaction (β = -.152, t = -
2.048, p < .05).  Again the hypothesis was partially supported in that the FDS and two 
of the BMPN subscales contributed small but significant predictive power to the model 
predicting scores on the Macro Worry subscale.  Additionally, the correlations between 
variables and the Macro Worry subscale were in anticipated directions: FDS (r = .179), 
Related Dissatisfaction (r = .206), Competence Satisfaction (r = -.106). 
Hypothesis four 
This hypothesis predicted that subscales on the BMPN would significantly 
predict pathological worry (PSWQ scores).  A standard linear regression was conducted 
with PSWQ scores as the criterion variable and the six BMPN subscales as predictor 
variables.  The predictive model was found to be significant with a small to medium 
effect size (R2 = .221, adjusted R2 = .203, F(6, 257) = 12.163, p < 0.001).  Of the six 
predictors, four were found to significantly contribute to the overall predictive model.  
Relatedness Satisfaction (β = .204, t = 3.204, p < .01) and Dissatisfaction (β = .251, t = 
3.487, p < .01), as well as Autonomy Satisfaction (β = -.250, t = -3.499, p < .01) and 
Dissatisfaction (β = .144, t = 1.969, p = .05).  Scores on the two competence subscales 
did not significantly predict PSWQ scores. 
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Research Questions 
The first research question concerned testing correlations between FDS, BMPN 
and MLQ scores to explore relationships between faith and psychological needs on 
reported search for and presence of meaning in life (which had been partially tested 
between FDS and MLQ in Hypothesis two) to significantly correlate to pathological 
worry (PSWQ).  A Pearson product-moment correlation was conducted using nine 
variables overall (BMPN-6, MLQ-2, FDS-1).  To control for the risk of type-one error 
due to this multiple comparison, a Bonferroni adjustment was made wherein the alpha 
value (p < .05) is divided by the number of comparisons made (Dunn, 1961). Since 
there are 9 items being compared with each other, the number of unique comparisons is 
n * (n - 1) / 2 = (9*8) / 2 = 36 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  The adjusted alpha value 
for testing significance of comparisons is then .05 / 36 = .001.   
As was expected, significant, medium to strong correlations (r ranged from .3 to 
.5, p <.001) were found between all corresponding subscales of the BMPN (i.e., 
dissatisfaction subscales with other dissatisfaction subscales and then the same 
comparisons between satisfaction subscales group).  Autonomy dissatisfaction was the 
only BMPN subscale to significantly correlate with the FDS (r = .216, p < .001).  This 
is in contrast to anticipated negative correlation between FDS and autonomy 
dissatisfaction.  Another unanticipated significant correlation was between the FDS and 
MLQ-P.  The two variables were found to have a medium, negative correlation (r = -
.304, p < .001).  Between the BMPN and MLQ subscales, multiple significant 
correlations were noted.  All subscales had significant, medium correlations to MLQ-P 
scores (p ≤ .001) such that satisfaction scores positively correlated and dissatisfaction 
82 
scores negatively correlated with MLQ-P scores.  Regarding the MLQ-S, all BMPN 
dissatisfaction subscales had small to medium positive correlations (p < .001).  
However, only the Autonomy Satisfaction subscale had a significant correlation to the 
MLQ-S subscale (r = -.216, p < .001). 
Another research question was what impact age had on the current variables of 
interest.  A second Pearson product moment correlation was conducted including age, 
PSWQ, FDS, MLQ, and BMPN (see Table 2).  As 11 variables were included, the 
Bonferroni correction resulted in a minimum significance value of p =.0009.  With the 
corrected statistical significance value, age did not significantly correlate with any other 
entered variables.  However, it was noteworthy that age did have a small, negative 
correlation with both FDS and PSWQ scores (p = .001). 
One final research question that was of interest was if there were significant 
mean score differences on meaning in life subscales between differing faith stage 
groups.  That is, did respondents from different faith stages differ significantly in their 
reported search for and presence of meaning in life?  An independent-samples t-test was 
run comparing high and low faith stage groups (as they were previously divided for 
hypothesis one) on both subscales of the MLQ, and significant mean differences were 
found in scores between FDS groups on both subscales.  When comparing groups on 
presence of meaning in life the data violated the assumption of equal variance 
(Levene’s test p = .001); thus, “equal variances not assumed” data was used to interpret 
the t-test results.  Regarding presence of meaning in life, the high FDS group had an 
average score of 25.14 (SD = 7.15), while the low FDS group had an average score of 
28.95 (SD = 5.09); t (192.96) = 4.860, p < .001 (two-tailed).  When comparing groups 
83 
on search for meaning, the mean difference reversed with the higher score being that of 
the high FDS group (M = 21.04, SD = 8.13) when compared to the scores of the low 
FDS group (M = 18.78, SD = 7.80). 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
 
 The purpose of the current research was to explore the impact of a theoretical 
model of several related correlates on both the quantity and content of worry in people’s 
lives. Worry was explained in terms of having an orientation and preoccupation with 
possible negative future events and that, when experienced as uncontrollable or at 
pathologically high levels (especially in regards to self-focused issues), it tends to be 
associated with negative psychological well-being (Boehnke et al., 1998; Borkovec, 
1994; Borkovec & Roemer, 1995; Delgado et al., 2010).  As despair is understood as a 
sense of hopelessness in effecting future change, it seems it would be synonymous with 
the notion of pathological worry described here.  This study was initiated to explore 
several aspects of the human experience that seem to relate to setting the psychological 
stage for worry, specifically pathological worry.  As the desire for avoidance of future 
threats would seem to be a universal experience, the current exploration was not 
concerned with factors that could somehow render one’s psychological fields to be 
absent of worry. Rather, it was hoping to search for which factors contribute to the 
fostering of pathological worry, as well as factors helping prevent pathological levels of 
worry.  Faith, meaning, and one’s ability to self-determine in life all fit this search, and 
the results of this study lent support to this assertion. In making this assertion however, 
the author is not suggesting these are the only such factors involved with pathological 
worry. 
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Hypothesis one 
 As was reported in the results section, the STS negatively correlated with the 
FDS, which was in contradiction to the original hypothesis and ultimately altered the 
testing of other hypotheses.  The direction of this correlation prevented the separation of 
the high FDS group into two separate groups (a high and low transcendence group).  
Although this split could still have been made in the high FDS group, it would have 
lacked theoretical backing as the low FDS group had higher STS scores.  This could be 
explained in conjunction with Fowler’s (1986) assertion that people can live lives of 
subjective satisfaction and meaning at each faith stage.   
However, it was anticipated that the STS’s emphasis on universality (i.e., 
connection to all humanity) would provide a distinguishing factor between low and high 
FDS groups, since an increasing sense of connectedness and inclusiveness is a hallmark 
of the progression through Fowler’s stages (especially as movement beyond stage four 
takes place).  This significant difference was not found between groups.  Even when the 
Universality subscale alone was examined between FDS groups, no significant 
difference was found between groups on the scores.  In fact, of the three STS subscales, 
the one demonstrating the most significant difference between low and high FDS was 
the Prayer Fulfillment subscale with the low FDS group having significantly higher 
mean scores on the subscale than the high FDS group. 
The large difference on this subscale between groups within the FDS seemed to 
account for a large portion of the variance on differing STS scores, as there was little to 
no mean difference between the high and low groups on the other two subscales 
(connectedness and universality) when examined individually.  The low and high FDS 
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groups also significantly differed on a general question regarding how often they pray, 
with the lower group reporting greater frequency.  This positive correlation between 
religiosity and transcendence has been observed before in the literature (Macdonald & 
Holland, 2002).  As opposed to an understanding of this finding resting with a weakness 
of the STS, perhaps the explanation more aptly resides with the FDS.  As the results of 
this study unfold, it would seem that the FDS is failing to account for differences 
between Fowler’s (1981) concept of individuative-reflective (stage four) and 
conjunctive (stage five) faith.   
What the scale seems to highlight is that scores indicate disagreement with or 
continued acceptance of previously learned notions of spirituality and religion.  Low 
scores are consistent with a description of a respondent securely rooted in a stage three 
faith.  However, high scores only indicate that an individual disagrees with this 
hallmark of a stage three faith.  The forced-choice response format only allows for a 
“settled” vs. “searcher” category.  For example, item numbers three and four on the 
FDS offer the following choice combinations: 
A.  It is very important for me to critically examine my religious beliefs and values. 
B.  It is very important for me to accept the religious beliefs and values of my church. 
 
A.  My religious orientation comes primarily from my own efforts to analyze and 
understand God. 
B.  My religious orientation comes primarily from the teaching of my family and 
church. 
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Within the first pair, someone could find it very important to critically examine beliefs 
and values, but then ultimately decide, based on those critically examined values, that it 
is important for them to find a faith body that is consistent with said beliefs and values.  
This statement would seem much more in line with what has previously been described 
as a stage five faith.  Again, in the second pair of responses, if one has arrived through 
individual analysis and searching at a religious orientation espoused by family or 
church, it would be consistent that one could then define that personal orientation as 
primarily consistent with the greater body of family (a subjective term) and/or church 
(faith) and not as a solely individual endeavor.   
A combination of the two choices that respondents were forced to choose 
between might have been the more appropriate and truthful response.  For this reason, 
perhaps the FDS was not as reliable as was originally thought as a tool for 
differentiating between Fowler’s stages.  This would also provide some explanation 
why measures such as the STS, PSWQ and Micro worry subscale negatively correlated 
with the FDS, and why low FDS groups (scoring ≤ 4) scored lower on these measures.  
Perhaps some of these respondents were actually indicating a more mature faith stage 
response that was inadequately accounted for due to the FDS’ limited forced choice 
response system.  In fact, since this study was initiated and data collection completed, 
the author of the FDS has introduced the Revised Faith Development Scale (RFDS) to 
address some of these issues.  The new scale allows participants to respond to all items 
using a Likert-type scale of 1 to 4 (1 being “very unlike me” and 4 “very much like 
me”).  A scaled response such as this will probably be better suited to capture the range 
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of subjective differences among respondents, as opposed to forcing them into polarized 
categories. 
The high and low FDS groups also differed on macro worry scores with the high 
group displaying higher mean macro worry scores.  While this would seem to support 
of the original hypothesis (i.e., higher faith stage respondents should be more concerned 
with global issues beyond the self), the finding must be considered in light of the 
finding that these same high FDS group respondents are also demonstrating higher 
mean scores on the PSWQ and significantly higher scores on the Micro Worry subscale.  
The higher scoring FDS group worried more according to all measures of worry.  
Pathological worriers not only worry at higher levels but also about a greater number of 
things (Roemer, Molina, & Borkovec, 1997). With this in mind, due to the inability to 
state with confidence that the higher FDS groups do in fact represent higher stages of 
faith development, the significant difference between groups on Micro worry should be 
seen as further evidence that underlying factors in the high FDS group seem to leave its 
members prone to greater worry in general. Some evidence pertaining to an explanation 
to the question of why these groups differ is found as the discussion continues. 
The results of hypothesis one testing ultimately affected the testing of the 
theoretical model (see Table 3), but did not render the model completely invalid.  What 
was consistent is that those indicating a state of disagreement with their previous in-
group (high FDS response), also indicated higher search for meaning, lower presence of 
meaning, and higher pathological worry.  These self-reported scores are consistent with 
both the proposed correlates to stage four faith and states of transition in the theoretical 
model. 
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Hypothesis two 
 As was originally hypothesized, and consistent with previous research on 
meaning and measures of psychological well-being, the MLQ’s presence and search 
subscales correlated with the PSWQ in opposite directions (Ho, Cheung, & Cheung, 
2010; Steger, Oishi, & Kashdan, 2009; Steger & Kashdan, 2007).  This relationship is 
logical, although no previous study was found that had paired the constructs, and the 
findings supported the theoretical model proposed.   
As was described at the outset of the study, the concept of pathological worry is 
to be understood as a phenomenon occurring in a situation in which an individual 
anticipates a future threat while also believing that their problem-solving abilities will 
be insufficient to handle said task (Borkovec, 2002; Borkovec & Roemer, 1995; Wells, 
2006).  If worry is a primarily cognitive construct focused on one’s inability to 
adequately deal with life’s myriad difficulties, then it would seem the antidote would be 
to reduce the number of difficulties experienced.  Two such antidotes would be 
increasing personal competence (i.e., increase one’s ability to adequately handle 
personal difficulties) or somehow avoid encountering personally threatening difficulties 
altogether (e.g., reduce interactions with others, avoid risky situations).  In fact, in a 
recent article entitled “Looking on the bright side: Accessing benign meanings reduces 
worry,” Hirsch, Hayes, and Mathews (2009) share findings indicating that if individuals 
can practice anticipating benign outcomes in threatening situations, it will reduce 
overall anxiety, resulting in better outcomes in the midst of a worrisome situation.  
However, when that doesn’t work, or when a benign outcome is actually incongruent 
with the reality of a situation, the question seems to remain, “what can combat the 
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despair realized in a state of hopelessness?” Hopelessness being a state which fits 
within the definition of the personal experience of pathological worry (a perceived 
inability to meet one of life’s demands). 
 The acknowledgment of the presence of meaning in life (e.g., my life/these 
events are filled with meaning waiting to be acknowledged/discovered; or even, the 
redemptive power of meaning is always a potential outcome when encounters seem 
negative or empty) should serve as an antidote to the engagement of despair as the two 
constructs (beliefs) are mutually incompatible. Consistent with the current study, 
previous research has indicated that the constructs of presence of meaning and search 
for meaning are negative correlates (Steger et al., 2006).  However, Steger et al. also 
propose four potential states of meaning in life: meaning diffusion (low presence, low 
search), meaning foreclosure (high presence, low search), meaning moratorium (low 
presence, high search), or meaning achievement (high presence, high search), thus 
search and presence are not, by definition completely mutually exclusive (Brassai, Piko, 
& Steger, 2012). 
 The current study indicated that as presence of meaning scores increased, 
pathological worry scores decreased.  It also found that as search for meaning scores 
increased, pathological worry scores also increased.  Religion and spirituality offers a 
framework for subjective meaning conceptualization which potentially contributes to a 
better understanding these findings.  This link between constructs is most evident when 
this theme of hopelessness is contrasted against the idea that religion and spirituality 
provide means of hope to its adherents.  This hope may differ in its object (eternal life, 
peace, nirvana, humanity’s goodness…) between traditions, but its existence as a 
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consistent narrative theme across traditions is definitional.  This study supports the 
concept that increased engagement of religious/spiritual activities (i.e., engagement in 
prayer/meditation, attendance of religious ceremonies/services, and study of related 
literature) and higher reported spiritual transcendence (prayer fulfillment, 
connectedness, and universality) move one towards a greater likelihood of reported 
presence of meaning in life and lower reported pathological worry.  As explanations for 
why people worry and ways to prevent harmful degrees of worry are explored, the 
construct of meaning in life would seem a strong theoretical and empirical component 
of the discussion.   
As previously mentioned, this study did find significant differences between 
males and females regarding scores on the PSWQ.  As the PSWQ has been widely used 
as a valid measure of pathological worry in studies including both males and females, 
the finding in the current study were not considered to have a confounding effect. The 
fact that no other significant differences between genders were found on any other 
subscales used supports the idea that this gender difference may have more to do with 
the PSWQ as a measure than indicative of generalizable gender differences. This gender 
discrepancy has been explored by others in a variety of ways, while still asserting the 
validity of the measure as a tool for measuring pathological or maladaptive worry 
(Conway, et. al., 2003; Meyer et al., 1990; Robichaud et al., 2003; Zlomke & Hahn, 
2010). An additional consideration for the current study is the fact that hypotheses did 
not include comparisons between high and low PSWQ groups, as the high group would 
have obviously contained a disproportionate number of females. The measure provided 
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a valid continuum-based score on self-reported worry that could be used in correlational 
and predictive models in spite of the gender differences in overall score. 
 
Hypothesis three (parts one and two) 
 To better understand the foundational makeup of groups differing on faith 
development, the two established FDS groups (high and low) were compared on the 
various subscales of the BMPN.  These comparisons were grounded in previous 
discussion highlighting the theoretical overlap regarding SDT and certain unique 
aspects of Fowler’s (1981) proposed stages.  Interestingly, what differed significantly 
between groups was not the level of satisfaction in regards to psychological needs but 
the levels of dissatisfaction.  Respondents indicating higher-level responses on the FDS 
had significantly higher dissatisfaction scores on the autonomy and relatedness 
subscales, as well as observed, but not statistically significant, mean differences on the 
competence subscale.  This positive relationship to dissatisfaction appears to have face 
validity within the content of the forced-choice responses that makeup the FDS 
measure.  Many of the “more developed” responses are marked by statements requiring 
the adherent to acknowledge the presence of disagreement, incompatibility, and conflict 
regarding faith tradition and values.  To this end, and consistent with previous 
discussion, the FDS seems to highlight contrasting levels of dissatisfaction between its 
high and low scores.  It would also seem that what it fails to capture is the journey from 
satisfaction to dissatisfaction and then back to a new and subjectively more 
comprehensive agreement or satisfaction (i.e., faith stages 3 to 4 and then 5 and 
beyond). Again, this finding partially upheld the proposed theoretical model represented 
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in Table 3.  Dissatisfaction on relatedness and autonomy were indicative of increased 
worry.  
To some extent, the FDS’ ability to highlight dissatisfaction as an aspect of 
greater levels of maturity is consistent with other stage theories (Miller, 2001).  The 
consistency lies with dissatisfaction being commensurate with disequilibrium, which 
could be argued as a prerequisite to growth.  The benefit of having tested this 
hypothesis are that the results do indicate that the FDS is significantly differentiating on 
levels of dissatisfaction.  This would suggest that it could offer insight into stage 
contentment or transition regarding faith status. 
To further explore the relationship between worry and faith (and subsequently 
the construct of meaning), the combination of FDS and BMPN subscales were used as 
constructs to form a predictive model regarding worry quality (micro versus macro 
worry).  This model was found to be significant with the relatedness dissatisfaction 
subscale and FDS score variables serving as significant predictors of micro and macro 
worry.  Again, relatedness dissatisfaction was the greater predictor and accounted for a 
larger portion of the variance when compared to FDS score.  This is consistent with part 
one of this hypothesis, which demonstrated significant differences on levels of 
dissatisfaction between high and low FDS scores. 
Consistent with the hypothesized results was that a stage four faith would have 
higher levels of relatedness dissatisfaction.  However, it has already been discussed that, 
based on current results, the FDS’ ability as an effective tool for specific faith stage 
differentiation and placement is questionable.  Higher FDS scores also consistently 
resulted in higher macro worry scores (i.e., greater amount of universal concern).  It is 
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of interest that those respondents struggling with higher levels of dissatisfaction also 
displayed a greater level of concern for others.  If dissatisfaction is a state consistent 
with evolution, perhaps this study’s findings concerning macro worry are tapping into a 
combination of traits representative of those needed for movements such as major social 
change (e.g., civil rights movement).  Satisfied individuals may be less inclined to 
consider others’ dissatisfaction with their current stance on various issues (e.g., issues 
of social justice), as considering an opposing viewpoint risks introducing some 
dissatisfaction, which would require personal change to rectify. 
 
Hypothesis four 
The fourth hypothesis further explored pathological worry (PSWQ scores) by 
testing a predictive model using the BMPN subscales.  Relatedness and Autonomy were 
found to be significant predictors with Relatedness Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction and 
Autonomy Satisfaction serving as the most significant predictors.  While Relatedness 
Dissatisfaction and Autonomy Satisfaction seem likely candidates for accurately 
predicting the presence of pathological worry, Relatedness Satisfaction predicting it in a 
positive direction was unexpected (i.e., standardized beta value indicated a medium 
positive relationship between relatedness satisfaction and PSWQ scores).  It was 
previously expected that higher satisfaction scores on the BMPN would be indicative of 
less worry as the satisfaction of psychological needs has been demonstrated to be 
positively correlated with measures of psychological well-being (Sheldon & Hilpert, 
2012).  However, these findings would seem to suggest otherwise. 
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To better understand this finding, recalling the three questions making up the 
Relatedness Satisfaction subscale is helpful: 
“I feel a strong sense of intimacy with people I spend time with.” 
“I feel close and connected with other people who are important to me.” 
“I feel a sense of contact with people who care for me, and whom I care for.” 
Respondents answered each of these items by indicating a score on a scale of one to five 
(1- “not at all true of me,” 3- “somewhat true of me,” 5- “very true of me”).  As they 
read, a person reporting items to be “very true” of them is actually reporting on the 
intensity of their connection to people with whom they already identify being 
connected.  Although the subscale is intended to indicate one’s satisfaction with their 
relatedness, on second glance it could lack some face validity in that it isn’t directly 
asking about how satisfied people are with their relationships, but rather indicates a self-
perceived report on the intensity of the closeness of one’s close relationships.  When 
considering the relationship to worry, one could conceivably indicate a lower score on 
the intensity of closeness in their relationships (i.e., Relatedness Satisfaction) and a 
higher score on their degree of Autonomy Satisfaction and benefit from lower levels of 
pathological worry despite a lower score on Relatedness “Satisfaction.”  High scores on 
Relatedness Satisfaction do not seem to provide much protective power against worry.  
This finding is consistent with previous research indicating that interpersonal issues are 
the most prominent object of worry in both high and low worriers (individuals 
diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder and an anxiety diagnosis-free control 
group); (Breitholtz, Johansson, & Ost, 1999; Roemer, Molina, & Borkovec, 1997).  
Thus, to the extent that individuals acknowledge an intense connection to others, they 
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also acknowledge an intensity of investment in a category of life that tends to be the 
greatest object of people’s worry.  This finding also supports the theoretical model 
proposed and offers some explanation as to why a stage three faith, with high 
relatedness satisfaction, would still be prone to higher levels of worry. 
When people are highly invested or concerned in others’ abilities to adequately 
manage their own difficulties, the person concerned for the other risks that their concern 
may devolve into worry.  This seems likely to occur when the worrier is faced with the 
reality that they are helpless to adequately address or eliminate this perceived future 
threat for the object of their concern (e.g., a parent worrying about their son or daughter 
making wise choices upon leaving for college, worrying about a close friend’s ability to 
make an important public presentation, worrying for a friend’s ability to pay their 
mortgage when one doesn’t have the resources to pay it for them, etc.).  This brings the 
concepts of autonomy and locus of control to the forefront, which were highlighted by 
findings related to the other BMPN subscales. 
 In testing this hypothesis, it was found that Autonomy, but not Competence, 
served as a significant predictor of worry.  An examination of the items making up the 
Competence scales is once again revealing: 
 “I do well even at hard things.” (satisfaction) 
 “I struggle doing things I should be good at.” (satisfaction) 
 “I successfully complete difficult tasks and projects.” (satisfaction) 
 “I have recently experienced failure or been unable to do well at something.”  
(dissatisfaction) 
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These items do not by definition, or possible response, place a respondent in a state of 
helplessness or hopefulness indicative of the presence of pathological worry.  One could 
have recently experienced a failure at something with which they are normally 
successful, but then also know that they have and will do well at other difficult tasks.  
The response depends much on the respondents’ subjective experience of the items and 
the personal situations they bring to mind, but no matter the response, the individual’s 
locus of control can remain internalized, a state indicative of better psychological well-
being (Ryan & Deci, 2000b). 
Conversely, the Autonomy subscale items would seem to highlight this notion of 
internal versus external control of one’s life: 
“I really do what interests me.” (satisfaction) 
“I have to do things against my will.” (dissatisfaction) 
“I am free to do things my own way.” (satisfaction) 
To the extent respondents indicate a less autonomous self-perception, a logical 
connection is that they would also believe their ability to adequately manage life’s 
difficulties is compromised, a state consistent with the definition of worry (Borkovec, 
1994).  This state would seem consistent with the position that life is “happening to 
one,” as opposed to asserting one’s ability to actively engage life in a meaningful way.  
 
Research Questions 
 Continuing the discussion of the significance of Autonomy, the exploratory 
research questions also supported findings made in the course of hypothesis testing.  
Correlations were examined between measures of psychological needs, faith 
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development, and Meaning in Life. After the Bonferroni adjustment, to account for the 
potential of Type I error, Autonomy Dissatisfaction was the only significant correlate 
with the FDS, and Autonomy Satisfaction was the only significant correlate with Search 
for Meaning in Life.  As previously noted, higher scores on the FDS are consistent with 
individuals having experienced historical or current disagreement with the beliefs and 
values found in their faith/spiritual history.  The Autonomy Dissatisfaction score is 
assessed with statements such as, “There are people telling me what I have to do,” and 
“I have to do things against my will.”  High FDS scores indicate having disagreed with 
but not liberated from a faith tradition. To disagree, but not assert one’s autonomy to 
reconcile or separate from irksome issues, implies a dissatisfied state by definition. 
 The finding that those demonstrating Autonomy Satisfaction seemed to be less 
involved in searching for meaning may indicate that being satisfied with one’s sense of 
autonomy is in itself a meaningfully satisfying state.  To be confident of one’s ability to 
act autonomously supersedes situational specifics.  This finding is also represented in 
the theoretical model (Table 3), indicating that satisfied states do not result in the drive 
to search for meaning. 
 Frankl’s (1955) theory regarding humanity’s search for meaning offers some 
striking consistencies with this finding.  Frankl asserted that one need not search for an 
elusive meaning in life but rather that meaning could be found in each situation and 
circumstance as one responded to it.  To the extent one is satisfied with their Autonomy 
status (as measured and understood in the current study), one has confidence that they 
can ultimately respond successfully.  One is not assured that their response will 
successfully accomplish the original intent (competence).  However, they can rest 
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assured in their ability to adaptively respond (Autonomy), knowing that circumstances 
and their responses will evolve and change. As long as they continue to intentionally 
respond they are actively engaging life, thereby experiencing meaning.  Mean 
comparisons between low and high FDS groups confirm these directional findings. 
Interestingly, age, which was expected to be a significant correlate with several 
variables, was not significant with any (after Bonferroni adjustment).  However, the 
direction of the correlations with age that did exist were in anticipated directions 
(positive with presence of meaning in life). 
 
Limitations 
Unfortunately, as with much social research, initial limitations were obviously 
noted regarding sample diversity.  As can be seen in the demographics table (Table 1.0), 
the majority of respondents were Caucasian, Christian, females.  The sample provided 
enough variability between sexes to make some comparisons but definitely did not 
produce the ethnic or religious diversity originally desired.  This was disappointing as 
care was taken to disseminate the survey to diverse groups (i.e., differing religious and 
secular institutions, as well as exposure to diverse groups through social media and 
email).  Although the sample has some cultural consistency within the geographical 
location from which the research was based, it was hoped that use of the internet would 
move the sampling beyond physical borders. This reality limits generalizability of any 
study findings until future research can demonstrate their applicability with other 
culturally diverse samples.   
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Regarding measures used, it has already been mentioned that a significant 
limitation discovered in data analysis was the inability to use the FDS to differentiate 
faith stage differences beyond high and low scores.  Additionally, as the FDS was 
compared to other scales it became evident that the high and low scorers did not behave 
in ways that were anticipated to be consistent with higher levels of faith development.  
The fact that the authors have now developed the Revised Faith Development scale 
attests to some of the scale’s weaknesses in the current study (Harris & Leak, 2013).  
Had the RFDS been available for use as the current study was being developed, it might 
have been more successful at differentiating between FDS respondents as it allows for 
responses to be set on a continuum rather than forced-choice polar opposite categories. 
 
Future research 
 With the high prevalence rates of Generalized Anxiety Disorder in society and 
the proven lethality of chronically high stress levels, the construct of worry should 
continue to be high on the list of researchers wanting to make a readily applicable 
impact on society for the better (Querstret & Cropley, 2013; Verkuil, Brosschot, 
Gebhardt, & Thayer, 2010).  Fertile grounds for further exploration include examining 
conditions for optimal growth of one’s sense of autonomy, understood as a sense of 
personal agency, as well as better understanding factors involved in the development 
and satisfaction of personal meaning.  Also interesting would be further investigation 
into Self-Determination Theory’s emphasis on intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation and 
their impact on one’s propensity to worry (Deci & Ryan, 2000). 
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As a continuation of the issue regarding the FDS mentioned as a limitation, even 
with the revision of the RFDS, this researcher believes that the scale still fails to 
adequately catalogue the journey of faith development.  That is, the scale does not 
explore how contented people actually are and how it is that they arrived at their current 
state.  For example, the scale penalizes people on maturity if they responded that they 
did not disagree with their church on faith matters or if their faith looked very much like 
that of their parents.  While these indicators may be consistent with a lower level of 
faith development, they may also be indicative of someone who has wandered far and 
critically chosen a faith stance consistent with their hard-earned beliefs, which may be 
compatible with their current faith community or family of origin.  Future research 
regarding Fowler’s (1981) theory would benefit greatly from a self-report measure that 
more competently captures the experience of the development of one’s faith.  To their 
credit, the RFDS authors shift focus away from Fowler’s (1981) theory being highly 
associated with the scale and emphasize the scale as a tool for measuring post-
conventional religious reasoning. 
Future clinical research should focus on the implications of the constructs 
examined in this study in a psychotherapeutic context.  The development of autonomy, 
pursuit of meaning, development of faith, and finding peace in the midst of worry and 
stress are issues encountered daily in the course of treatment provided by psychologists 
and counselors.  Any applicable contribution to evidenced-based practice regarding 
these issues would be more than welcomed by mental-health practitioners and the 
clients and patients they work with and treat. 
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Finally, future research in the field of theology and religion could continue the 
examination of the constructs’ impact on faith development.  Further testing of the 
theoretical model would behoove faith communities as they attempt to aid their 
members towards greater meaning in life.  By utilizing the theoretical model proposed 
to help explain the foundational aspects of this development, it could refine the focus of 
faith leaders and seekers and help concentrate efforts at increasing individual and 
communal well-being. 
 
Implications and Conclusion 
 Frankl (1963) suggests that healthy psychological well-being is not marked by a 
tensionless state (a state without worry or concern), but that the well-being is defined 
and life-meaning is found in one’s response to the tension.  Some of the 
psychophysiology of stress was discussed earlier in this study, and it was pointed out 
that allostatic load (chronic stress) has a deleterious impact on both physical and mental 
well-being (Lovallo, 2005; McEwen & Stellar, 1993).  Stress (chronic threat 
anticipation and subsequent state of readiness to respond) and pathological worry 
(chronic threat anticipation and subsequent doubts about one’s state of readiness to 
adequately respond) seem synonymous.  This study offers some insight into what might 
protect some from pathological worry, and it seems to hinge on how one experiences 
and defines threat. 
 Frankl (1963) pointed out, and none seek to dispute, that with life exists tension.  
However, it would seem that not all tension need be experienced as threat. This study’s 
results suggest that embracing a system of resources and support (i.e., lower scores on 
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FDS and STS, whether received via tradition and social learning or arrived at via 
critical analysis, or both) as well as believing in one’s ability to respond (Autonomy 
Satisfaction) could result in an ability to successfully experience and navigate the 
inevitable, universal tension of life.  This success is not only marked by lower 
pathological worry but a higher perception of life as meaning-filled.  If humanity’s 
ultimate fear is annihilation, then the ironic truth is that as long as one can engage in 
fearing this object, it hasn’t come to pass.   
Existence implies action by definition, and it would seem that the psychological 
need that carried the most weight regarding worry protection was the one that is most 
fundamentally related to what it means to exist (Autonomy).  In collectivist cultures this 
autonomy may very well be acted out in conjunction with, and never considered apart 
from, the greater good (heteronomous), but this does not detract from the individual’s 
subjective experience and satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their sense of autonomy 
Care must be taken not to understand the concept of autonomy strictly from 
individualistic cultural lenses (Luciano, 2010).   
A connection to faith and spirituality, rather than thwarting autonomy, may 
provide a manageable framework within which to assert one’s autonomy.  As autonomy 
is understood as a personal sense of agency, it would seem that faith and spirituality 
have much to do with highlighting this aspect of the human experience.  The critique 
that faith, spirituality, or religion do existential harm by attempting to manipulate the 
direction in which one’s agency is applied should first observe the pre-requisite 
assertion implied in the critique, which is that one’s sense of agency must be awakened 
and engaged before directed movement can occur. As hypothesized, presence of 
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meaning in life does appear to serve as an antagonist to pathological worry and it seems 
to be an experience achieved in the act of engaging one’s autonomy (agency).  Thus, 
considering the variables studied here, it would seem that correlates moving in the 
direction of decreased pathological worry (e.g., presence of meaning in life, autonomy 
satisfaction, grounding in a faith/spiritual tradition) contribute to the universal human 
goal of a life well-lived. 
Regarding faith development and its proposed stages, it was obvious in this 
study that the FDS did not adequately capture the stages theorized by Fowler (1981), as 
was hoped.  However, Fowler (1986) noted that “we do not make the transition from 
one stage to another without disruption, pain, confusion, and loss” (p.40). He goes on to 
highlight that growth is not experienced apart from pain, but that as we see growth for 
what it is, we can experience and even embrace this necessary pain sans anxiety and 
fear (i.e., pathological worry), those being the elements by which pain actually harms 
us.  The study did seem to confirm that a state of conflict vis a vis issues of faith and 
spirituality does come with increased pain (worry, dissatisfaction, meaninglessness).  
However, it also seemed to confirm that working to honestly and courageously resolve 
the conflicts encountered regarding faith and spirituality, in spite of the accompanying 
growing pains, can lead to greater life satisfaction and, ultimately, a more meaning-
filled existence. 
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Table 1. Demographic Variables  
Gender Frequency Percent 
Male 73 27.70 
Female 191 72.30 
   
Race/Ethnicity   
White/Caucasian 229 86.74 
African-American 10 0.04 
Hispanic, Latino/a 9 0.03 
Asian 6 0.02 
Native American or Alaskan Native 
Middle Eastern 
1 
1 
<0.01 
<0.01 
Other 8 0.03 
   
Religious Affiliation   
Christian 194 73.50 
Agnostic 25 9.47 
Atheist 19 7.20 
Jewish 13 4.92 
Buddhist 1 < 0.01 
Other 12 4.55 
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Table 3. Current Study Reliability: Cronbach Alpha Values  
Measure Current study 
alpha 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire .95 
  
Micro Worry Subscale .85 
Macro Worry Subscale .90 
  
Faith Development Scale .66 
  
Balanced Measure of Psychological Needs Subscales  
Relatedness Satisfaction .81 
Relatedness Dissatisfaction .65 
Competence Satisfaction .81 
Competence Dissatisfaction .76 
Autonomy Satisfaction .65 
Autonomy Dissatisfaction .59 
  
Spiritual Transcendence Scale- Total Transcendence Subscale .78 
  
Meaning in Life Questionnaire  
Presence of Meaning in Life Subscale .91 
Search for Meaning in Life Subscale .90 
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Figure 1. Stage Structure (Fowler, 1986, p. 32) 
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Figure 2. Faith Stage Aspects (Fower, 1981, p. 244-45) 
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Figure 2. continued: Faith Stage Aspects (Fower, 1981, p. 244-45) 
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Appendix 1.0: Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) 
 
 
Instructions:  Rate each of the following statements on a scale of: 
        1    2   3  4  5  
  Not at all        Very typical 
typical of me           of me 
 
Please do not leave any items blank.  
  
___1.     If I do not have enough time to do everything, I do not worry about it.  
 
___2.     My worries overwhelm me.  
 
___3.     I do not tend to worry about things.  
 
___4.     Many situations make me worry.  
 
___5.     I know I should not worry about things, but I just cannot help it.   
 
___6.     When I am under pressure I worry a lot.  
 
___7.     I am always worrying about something.  
 
___8.     I find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts.  
 
___9.     As soon as I finish one task, I start to worry about everything else I have to do.    
 
___10.   I never worry about anything.  
 
___11.   When there is nothing more I can do about a concern, I do not worry about it 
      anymore.  
 
___12.   I have been a worrier all my life.  
 
___13.   I notice that I have been worrying about things.  
 
___14.   Once I start worrying, I cannot stop.  
 
___15.   I worry all the time.  
 
___16.   I worry about projects until they are all done. 
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Appendix 2.0: Micro/Macro Worry Scale 
 
 
Please ask yourself, “How worried, if at all, am I worried about…” 
 
1.  My getting cancer Macro 
2.  Conflict among groups in our society Micro 
3.  Worsening destruction of the environment Micro 
4.  Someone in my family not having enough 
money to live on 
Macro 
5.  My country getting involved in a war Macro 
6.  My life being boring Macro 
7.  Many people in our country living poverty Micro 
8.  My parents dying Micro 
9.  Our society not succeeding in maintaining 
high standards in education, science and 
technology 
Macro (borderline) 
10. Someone in my family being in a traffic 
accident 
Micro 
11. Things not working out in my studies or 
job 
Micro 
12. Someone close to me being infected with 
AIDS 
Micro 
13. Damage to nature (forests, animals, etc.) in 
our country 
Macro 
14. My not having any close friends Micro 
15. The population explosion in the third 
world 
Macro 
16. My being unattractive Micro 
17. A value crisis in society Macro 
18. My own death Micro 
19. Unemployment in our country Macro 
20. Politically motivated violence in our 
country 
Macro 
21. My life not really being meaningful Micro 
22. Hostility of people in the world toward one 
another 
Macro 
23. Pollution in my immediate neighborhood 
(air, water, noise, trash, etc.) 
Macro 
24. The outbreak of a nuclear war Macro 
25. My getting into financial difficulties some 
day 
Micro 
26. Humankind not being wise enough to 
make responsible use of new scientific 
knowledge 
Macro 
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27. My closest relationship breaking up Micro 
28. People in the world dying from hunger Macro 
29. My not really being good enough to get a 
job 
Micro 
30. People becoming addicted to hard drugs Macro 
31. My being the victim of a violent crime Micro 
32. A nuclear power plant leaking or blowing 
up 
Macro 
33. Simply about the future Macro 
 
Use a 5-point rating scale ranging from 0 to 4 with scores 0, 2, and 4 anchored verbally: 
0 = “no worry at all,” 2 = “somewhat worried”, 4 = “very worried”
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Appendix 4.0, Faith Development Scale (FDS) 
 
 
Instructions:  Please circle either A or B for the following 8 pairings according to which 
you feel best describes your current state. 
 
1. A.  I believe totally the teachings of my church. 
B.  I find myself disagreeing with my church over numerous aspects of my faith. 
 
2. A.  I believe that my church offers a full insight into what God wants for us and                                                                                                
how we should worship him. 
B.  I believe that my church has much to offer, but that other religions can also 
provide many religious insights. 
 
3. A.  It is very important for me to critically examine my religious beliefs and 
values. 
B.  It is very important for me to accept the religious beliefs and values of my 
church. 
 
4. A.  My religious orientation comes primarily from my own efforts to analyze 
and understand God. 
B.  My religious orientation comes primarily from the teaching of my family and 
church. 
 
5. A.  It does not bother me to become exposed to other religions. 
B.  I don’t find value in becoming exposed to other religions. 
 
6. A.  My personal religious growth has occasionally required me to come into 
conflict with my family or friends. 
B.  My personal religious growth has not required me to come into conflict with 
my family or friends. 
 
7. A.  It is very important that my faith is highly compatible with or similar the 
faith of my family. 
B.  It isn’t essential that my faith be highly compatible with the faith of my 
family. 
 
8. A.  The religious traditions and beliefs I grew up with are very important to me 
and do not need changing. 
B.  The religious traditions and beliefs I grew up with have become less and less 
relevant to my current religious orientation. 
133 
Appendix 5.0: Balanced Measure of Psychological Needs Scale (BMPN) 
 
Instructions: Please read the statements and think about how true you feel the statement 
represents you at this point in your life.  Then, indicate the degree to which statement 
each feels true using the 5-point scale shown at the top of the page.   
 
 
        1    2   3  4  5  
  Not at all      Somewhat    Very much 
 true of me     true of me      true of me 
 
____1.  I do well even at hard things. 
 
____2.  I really do what interests me. 
 
____3.  I feel a strong sense of intimacy with people I spend time with. 
 
____4.  I struggle doing some things I should be good at. 
 
____5.  I have to do things against my will. 
 
____6.  I have disagreements or conflicts with people I usually get along with. 
 
____7.  I successfully complete difficult tasks and projects. 
 
____8.  I am free to do things my own way. 
 
____9.  I feel a sense of contact with people who care for me, and whom I care for. 
 
____10.  I have recently experienced failure or been unable to do well at something. 
 
____11.  I have a lot of pressures I could do without. 
 
____12.  I am lonely. 
 
____13.  I take on and master hard challenges. 
 
____14.  My choices express my “true self.” 
 
____15.  I feel close and connected with other people who are important to me. 
 
____16.  I do stupid things that make me feel incompetent. 
 
____17.  There are people telling me what I have to do. 
 
____18.  I feel unappreciated by one or more important people. 
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Appendix 6.0, Assessment of Spirituality and Religious Sentiments- Self Report, 
Short Form (ASPIRES-SF) 
 
1) Age:_______ 
 
2) Gender: 
__Female 
__Male 
 
3) Race/Ethnicity: 
__American Indian / Native American 
__African American / Black 
__Caucasian / White 
__Hispanic / Latino(a) 
__Asian / Pacific Islander 
__Middle Eastern 
__Other: ________________________ 
 
4) Religious affiliation: 
    __Catholic 
    __Lutheran 
    __Methodist 
    __Episcopal 
    __Unitarian 
    __Baptist 
    __Presbyterian 
    __Mormon 
    __Other Christian, please specify:___________________________ 
    __Jewish 
    __Muslim 
    __Hindu 
    __Buddhist 
    __Atheist/Agnostic 
    __Other Faith Tradition, please specify:______________________________ 
 
Instructions: This questionnaire will ask you about various perceptions you hold about 
your view of the world and your place in it.  Answer each question on the scale 
provided by checking the response that best expresses your feelings.  If you are not sure 
of your answer or believe that the question is not relevant to you, then mark the 
“Neutral” category. 
 Please work quickly, do not spend too much time thinking about your responses 
to any single item.  Usually, your first answer is your best response, so go with your 
first reaction to the item. 
 
 
 
135 
Section I. 
1.  How often do you read the Bible/Torah/Koran/Geeta? 
__Never     __About once a month __Several times a week 
__About once or twice a year   __2 or 3 times a month 
__Several times a year   __Nearly every week 
 
2.  How often do you read religious literature other than the Bible/Torah/Koran/Geeta? 
__Never     __About once a month __Several times a week 
__About once or twice a year   __2 or 3 times a month 
__Several times a year   __Nearly every week 
 
3.  How often do you pray? 
__Never     __About once a month __Several times a week 
__About once or twice a year   __2 or 3 times a month 
__Several times a year   __Nearly every week 
 
4.  How frequently do you attend religious services? 
__Never __Occasionally __Quite often 
__Rarely __Often 
 
Section II. 
1.  In the quite time of my prayers and/or meditations, I find a sense of wholeness. 
__Strongly agree __Agree __Neutral __Disagree __Strongly disagree 
 
2.  I have done things in my life because I believed it would please a parent, relative, or 
friend that had died. 
__Strongly agree __Agree __Neutral __Disagree __Strongly disagree 
 
3.  Although dead, memories and thoughts of some of my relatives continue to influence 
my current life. 
__Strongly agree __Agree __Neutral __Disagree __Strongly disagree 
 
4.  I find inner strength and/or peace from my prayers and/or meditations. 
__Strongly agree __Agree __Neutral __Disagree __Strongly disagree 
 
5.  I do not have any strong emotional ties to someone who has died. 
__Strongly agree __Agree __Neutral __Disagree __Strongly disagree 
 
6.  There is no higher plane of consciousness or spirituality that binds all people. 
__Strongly agree __Agree __Neutral __Disagree __Strongly disagree 
 
7.  Although individual people may be difficult, I feel an emotional bond with all of 
humanity. 
__Strongly agree __Agree __Neutral __Disagree __Strongly disagree 
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8.  My prayers and/or meditations provide me with a sense of emotional support. 
__Strongly agree __Agree __Neutral __Disagree __Strongly disagree 
 
9.  I feel that on a higher level all of us share a common bond. 
__Strongly agree __Agree __Neutral __Disagree __Strongly disagree 
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Appendix 7.0: Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MLQ) 
 
Please take a moment to think about what makes your life feel important to you. Please 
respond to the following statements as truthfully and accurately as you can, and also 
please remember that these are very subjective questions and that there are no right or 
wrong answers. Please answer according to the scale below:  
 
Absolutely   Mostly Somewhat    Can’t Say     Somewhat Mostly Absolutely 
  Untrue   Untrue   Untrue True or False True   True      True 
       1        2         3   4     5      6         7 
 
1. ____I understand my life’s meaning. 
 
2. ____I am looking for something that makes my life feel meaningful.  
 
3. ____I am always looking to find my life’s purpose.  
 
4. ____My life has a clear sense of purpose.  
 
5. ____I have a good sense of what makes my life meaningful.  
 
6. ____I have discovered a satisfying life purpose.  
 
7. ____I am always searching for something that makes my life feel significant.  
 
8. ____I am seeking a purpose or mission for my life.  
 
9. ____My life has no clear purpose.  
 
10. ____I am searching for meaning in my life.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MLQ Presence and Search subscales:  
Presence- 1, 4, 5, 6, & 9-reverse-coded  
Search- 2, 3, 7, 8, & 10  
 
